A Backgrounder on Energy-Maneuverability

April 1, 2013, 9:59 pm

≫ Next: Charter Cable: Media Malpractice

≪ Previous: POGO’s Propaganda Circus: F-35’s “aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time”

Because if you learned all you know about E-M from Boyd, you’re only about a half-century behind the learning curve

Housekeeping

The first two things to remember in this kind of discussion are:

1. Performance metrics are used as PROXIES for what is important in a Weapon System under acquisition or already fielded. The metrics are NOT important in and of themselves. They are only as important as the degree to which they inform developers and operators on the system’s true versus desired capabilities.

and...

2. Weapon system specifications are initially established based upon what is believed to be needed and what is believed to be feasible within the projected budget and schedule before the development is given the ‘go-ahead’. There are only varying degrees of assumed confidence in the ability to achieve what is seen as feasible, and this depends much on perceived technology maturity. Only after the project is underway will the need and/or feasibility, given the actual maturity and budget, begin to be revealed, and it may be only truly knowable towards the end of development. Adjusting the specifications as new information is acquired, while still meeting Warfighter needs is sound engineering and management. It is NOT (as someone in the POGO crowd or ‘low information media’ might claim) “cheating” or a sign of “failure”.

Beyond Boyd: A Quick Survey of the Evolution AFTER the E-M Revolution

I’ve picked two AIAA papers on the subject to illustrate the post-Boyd reality: one from from the 1980’s and one from the 1990’s. There are a fairly large number of scholarly papers concerned with the inadequacy of the traditional Boyd ‘E-M diagram’ that lead right on up to the present day, but as T. Takahashi observed just last year in a paper proposing yet another ‘better way’ to visualize E-M:

For aircraft whose missions demanded combat maneuverability, the United States Air Force required production of Energy-Maneuverability (E-M) plots. The design of the F-14, F-15, F-16 and F-18 was tailored by designers working to better the E-M capability of Soviet aircraft. In this context, a government oversight driven tradition developed where industry was required to plot many aerodynamic and aircraft performance parameters as functions of speed and altitude.

To begin our review, I think one of the better overviews of how E-M factors evolved post-Boyd is encapsulated in a paper by Skow, Hamilton and Taylor (1985). They observed:

“In the late 1940's and early 1950’s, with the advent of jet propulsion, radical new wing designs and greatly expanded flight envelopes, a corresponding need for more definitive measures of merit for aircraft performance comparisons was generated. When the "century series" fighters were developed and rear-aspect IR missiles became the principal air-to-air combat weapon, point performance comparisons were found to be inconclusive and insufficient to predict superiority. Out of this need, energy-maneuverability (E-M) concepts were formulated and developed. In the 1960's. E-M came into widespread use by aircraft designers and fighter pilots. E-M provided an analog picture of a fighter's performance capabilities over a range of velocities and altitudes. It gave quantifiable credit to measures of merit which allowed the advantages of speed (energy) and turning (maneuverability) to be balanced. These measures of merit were shown to be dominant in determining the outcome of an air battle at that time.

...

But, as they say, time marches on, and in the past 10-12 years, several significant advancements have been made in the capabilities of fighter aircraft and air-to-air weapons. Three of these advancements; the all-aspect IR missile, greatly improved weapons delivery systems, and high thrust-to-weight engines have dramatically altered the character of the air battle, especially the close-in fight. The modern air battle is characterized by (1) time compression – shorter duration maneuvering required and (2) harder maneuvering - nose position at the expense of energy vs. nose position with energy conservation…

Air combat trends have expanded to ever increasing altitudes and speeds for beyond visual range (BVR) combat and conversely have tended to a lower and sometimes slower arena for close-in, within visual range (WVR) combat. … …This changing complexion of air combat, primarily due to the all-aspect IR missile, has altered the relative significance of the various performance characteristics with which we judge relative merit. Table 3 depicts the more common agility characteristics with some relative rankings.”

Table 3 Reconstruction from “Advanced Fighter Agility Metrics”

In 1992, Cox and Downing featured Befecadu (BF) Tamrat’s 1988 metric of Combat Cycle Time in the proposed system of “functional agility metrics” they evaluated for use in measuring aircraft maneuverability: Combat Cycle Time, Dynamic Speed Turn Plots, and Aircraft Energy State. The impetus for searching for these new metrics?

During the Korean War and the Vietnam conflict, jet fighter aircraft emerged with greatly expanded altitude and Mach ranges. This era also saw the advent of the short range heat seeking missile. These missiles required maneuvering to achieve a rear-aspect firing position. The measures of merit, altered to match the increase in aircraft capability, were advanced point performances (thrust-to-weight ratio, maximum Mach number, sustained turn rate, etc.) and the energy-maneuverability performance method. In recent years, the level of fighter aircraft and weapon system technological sophistication has reached new heights; the most critical advance being the development of the all-aspect infrared missile. This missile negates the requirement of maneuvering to achieve a rear-aspect firing position and concurrently has caused the traditional point performance measures of merit to become deficient for determining the combat effectiveness of a fighter aircraft. To remedy this deficiency, new measures of merit are being investigated which examine aircraft maneuver and control capabilities not previously quantified.

We could dive deep into discussion on each metric proposed in this paper, but I would like to focus on Tamrat’s Combat Cycle Time, as it is what differs most from the pioneering but simpler Boyd-Era POV of E-M, and the authors ably describe how Tamrat builds on same:

Traditionally, the need to achieve a rear-aspect position for a gun or missile firing opportunity led fighters to engage in battles lasting several minutes. These engagements were characterized by sustained maneuvering. This type of combat made the turn rate verses Mach number diagram (doghouse plot) useful for determining one fighter's advantage over another. When maneuvering for a rear-aspect firing solution, the interior of the doghouse plot is important. This interior region is represented by the sustained turn rate line and is typically dictated by available thrust and the lift to drag ratio of the aircraft. The compressed time scales of today's air combat arena have made sustained maneuvering less critical. The desire for a first shot opportunity leads to fights dominated by transient load factor/lift limited maneuvers. The emphasis then is shifting toward more dynamic maneuvering or the exterior of the doghouse plot. Figure 1 shows these critical regions on a conceptual doghouse plot.

From "Evaluation Of Functional Agility Metrics For Fighter Class Aircraft"

The first region is the dynamic pressure limit line (A) along which pitch rate is used to load the aircraft to enter a turning situation. Next, flight path and nose pointing maneuvers occur along the limit load factor and lift limit boundaries (B). The time to unload the aircraft is shown as the region in between the lift limit line and the 1-g line (C). The last critical region shown is the 1-g acceleration (D) in which an aircraft regains lost energy to leave the engagement or enter a turn to pursue another target. The Combat Cycle Time metric, developed by B.F. Tamrat combines these four critical regions into a single parameter. The time for each maneuver segment is calculated and then summed to obtain a time for the entire maneuver cycle. The critical regions, segment times, and corresponding maneuvers are:

A t, pitch up to load factor limit

B t, turn along load factor and lift limit

C t3, unload from elevated AOA/load factor

D t4, regain original energy level

The Combat Cycle Time metrics offers an advantage over traditional measure of merit for turning maneuvers. The doghouse plot shows the sustained and instantaneous turn rates for only one flight condition (i.e. specified power setting, mach, altitude, altitude, weight, etc.). The Combat Cycle Time, however, is characterized by a continually changing flight condition constrained within structural, lift, and power limits.

What it All Means

If there are recurring themes over the years in all the proposed metrics that move beyond Boyd/ Christie’s E-M diagram paradigm, it is 1) All-aspect missile attack changed the game and 2) the proposed metrics try to account for the missing values of the speed of ‘transition’: the time needed to point the aircraft in a desired direction from another, the ability to decelerate as well as accelerate in vertical and the horizontal, to change pitch, roll and yaw.

The lingering deference to standard E-M charting in the operational world springs more from their relative ease of understanding by non-engineer aircrew and government bureaucrats than from their utility. The E-M diagrams benefit from the fact that what really counts, is harder to explain. So we lumber along with the deficient E-M charting and rely on the ability of the untrained/uninterested to recognize the important nuances.

One of the biggest impacts on aircraft E-M performance that isn’t in the vehicle’s dynamics vis a vis the external environment (but sometimes dealt with in the OODA loop) is the man-machine interface: how fast the pilot perceives a change/threat and reacts to or preempts the effect of the change/threat by changing the vehicle dynamics. How well can the crew execute the mission in light of all the factors that could diminish the pilot’s ability to manage change and threats? Factors such as: How much attention does he have to pay to not bending or breaking the airplane or keep from departing controlled flight while engaged in the fight?

Limitations of Boyd-Era E-M Proxies and the F-35

A good example of the limitations of the traditional metrics is found in the caterwauling over the recent change in the F-35’s sustained-g turn standard from 5.3 to 4.6gs at some pre-selected altitude and speed. So much hang-wringing and finger-pointing—coming from those who not only do not know how important or unimportant the change was to needed/desired overall aircraft performance, but for the most part also have no idea what the change meant in and of itself, in ‘performance’ terms.

That, friend Reader, is a good lead-in for my next post (or two). Examine the reconstructed ‘Table 3’ above and ponder how the F-35 (especially the F-35A) performance stands up in the post-Boyd air combat world.

We'll soon engage in some speculative analysis on the F-35, but the speculation will be based upon logic, facts, physics, and experience.

References:

AIRCRAFT CONCEPT DESIGN PERFORMANCE VISUALIZATION USING AN ENERGY-MANEUVERABILITY PRESENTATION; Timothy T. Takahashi; AIAA 2012-5704

ADVANCED FIGHTER AGILITY METRICS; Andrew M. Skow, Willlam L. Hamilton, John H. Taylor; AIAA-A85-47027

EVALUATION OF FUNCTIONAL AGILITY METRICS FOR FIGHTER CLASS AIRCRAFT; Brian W. Cox, Dr. David R. Downing; AIAA-92-4487-CP

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Charter Cable: Media Malpractice

April 9, 2013, 6:05 pm

≫ Next: The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change

≪ Previous: A Backgrounder on Energy-Maneuverability

Charter News, 'Isn't'

(Still working on a lengthy 'aircraft/F-35 maneuverability' post, but this HAS to go up tonight.)

Charter Cable is my cable provider. NO complaints about the internet speed or connectivity, not even though I suspect their move to 'all digital' last week wreaked havoc with signals (off and on) as thousands of users finally added even more thousands of cable boxes and cards to the network in just a few days. It now seems to have stabilized, so 'no problem'.

But Charter Cable's 'homepage' has a section with rotating 'news' headline pictures and captions. All too often the caption and photo make it appear that some tragedy has happened in the US or even just the 'Modern' world, and you click on the link talking about a school being bombed with what appears to be a typical American elementary school (they've done school buses too if I recall correctly) and the story is about a school in some war zone in a 'turd world' country. The Chief and I just chalked it up to lazy web content developers and editors.

Today, they went beyond 'lazy' and deep into 'media malpractice' . I got home and booted up the laptop to check the web and this is what greeted me (left headline):

Charter Home Page 9 April 2013 ~1920 Hrs CST

WTFO? "Veteran Kills 13"?

I clicked on the link, and this is what popped up:

Charter 'Article' 9 April 2013 ~1920 Hrs CST

Oh. A Serbian 'vet' in Serbia loses it and goes on a rampage. Tragic in it's own right. Why the 'trick' headline?

You would have to be either incompetent or agenda-driven to put this one up. Either way it doesn't 'inform' but misleads and distorts several issues in one nice swoop.

Besmirching veteran's mental health? Check!

'Tragedy' as background for upcoming 2nd Amendment legislation? Check!

The Chief likes to try and calm me down when some unthinking slug nearly kills us because they're doing something clueless in traffic. She says something like "I'm sure they didn't see us". She forgets what makes me the MOST angry is the fact that they probably were clueless as to what was going on around them. If I assume Charter was just being 'brain dead' in this, it just p*sses me off more. tell me again: What business are they in? Do they have any standards?

Either way, Charter's website is Media Malpractice writ large in a Low Information Consumer world.

Are There ANY Adults At Charter Cable?

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The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change

April 16, 2013, 10:11 pm

≫ Next: Colin Clark: "Cost Estimates" and the F-35

≪ Previous: Charter Cable: Media Malpractice

PART 1 Introduction

I can’t remember when I saw so many media outlets, bloggers, and just general ‘people’ with their panties in a wad over something they didn’t really understand. Honestly, who among those ‘critics’ bemoaning the Sustained G turn requirement changing from 5.3 to 4.6Gs even know everything they need to know as ‘inputs’ before they could even begin to formulate an informed opinion on the topic? There is STILL insufficient information in the public domain to come to any conclusions, but there’s a heck of a lot of presumption and assumption in spite of it.

I was neck deep in a home improvement project when Dave Majumdar at FlightGlobal’s DEWline blog put up his“What's the operational impact of reducing the F-35's performance specs?” piece. Majumdar gave a pretty big voice to an ‘anonymous’ but ‘highly experienced ‘ fighter pilot that had all sorts of negatives to pass on to the public. (I believe if you view the Majumdar/Flight Global posts and articles that followed on the topic you’ll conclude the voice in question almost certainly was coming out of a Boeing F-18 test pilot). This ‘anonymous’ fighter pilot’s views were counter-balanced at the end by someone who had actual knowledge of the F-35.

Note: I now notice that the entire post I commented on has been rewritten (down the memory hole, eh?) but the parts I lament in my comment seems to have been ‘reformulated’ elsewhere in an article here. (If I have a major complaint about FlightGlobal’s reporting, it is just this kind of ‘rewriting history’ stuff.)

I commented, in part, the following at that time:

The really disturbing aspect of this 'story' is how an anonymous "highly experienced" fighter pilot somehow is able to gin up some world-class doom and gloom from a few insufficient data points. The doom and gloom gets quoted here, and now this article is being passed around by the anti-JSF crowd-- zipping around the globe as some sort of authoritative source. However, all there is really are two insufficient sets of information that in all honesty should prevent someone from reaching any conclusion other than the program is being 'managed'.

First, let's deal with the changing of the maximum sustained g-force value for the different variant turn performance criteria.

All we know is that 1) The sustained turn g-force objective is a proxy for overall aircraft maneuverability (not even a KPP) and 2) For the particular speed, bank angle, weight, and altitude data points selected, the program office lowered the ‘g’ value after extensive testing and analysis.

Aside from no real reason to assume the Program Office could or would do so without a good reason, or belief that the differences would not significantly impact operational performance, we should also consider the very real possibility that the F-35’s best sustained-g turn performance may have been found to lay outside the pre-selected test conditions. Perhaps by a little, perhaps by a lot. We don’t know. Not even “highly experienced” fighter drivers, unless they’re on the program, can divine the answer or what it means without more data.

On the one hand, I could have placed more emphasis on the ‘unknowns’: if only so a few of the others who were/are willfully ignoring them would have been perhaps a little less eager to jump on the ‘Lowering the Bar’ bandwagon. I COULD have typed “For the particular speed, bank angle, weight and altitude data points selected, [which are unknown to us] the program office lowered the ‘g’ value after extensive testing and analysis. On the other hand, I shed no tears for the self-identifying ignorami, and find the duping of a small number of media types merely... ‘unfortunate’.

Of course, the usual suspects took exception to my comments, and now the whole thread looks pretty silly as the article that I was critiquing, and others were defending (and OBTW also attacking me), is no longer even IN the article we all commented upon. But my prediction of the obvious, that the doom and gloom sound bites from a rather dubious source would spread like wildfire throughout the 'interwebs' while the factual counterarguments would remain alone and unloved proved all too true.

Fortunately, we have a few other data points that we can add to other information, including knowledge as to how programs and requirements ‘work’ and at least form one or more hypotheses as to what the relevance Sustained G spec change ‘means’-- based upon physics, publically released (vs. leaked) information (vs. unsubstantiated suspicions) about the F-35, and more importantly how everything relates to modern fighter design requirement priorities. We can make some assumptions (and identified as same) and use parametric modeling to more thoroughly understand the impacts of the changes, especially as they might either reflect or affect HOW the F-35 might ‘fight’ in the Within Visual Range (WVR) environment.

This post, as the title reflects, will concern itself with F-35 Sustained G-performance. I’ll get to the ‘Supersonic Dash’ spec change later.

“Sustained Flight”

Let’s begin with defining Sustained Flight, Sustained Level Flight, and what makes a ‘Sustained G’ Turn... a ‘Sustained G’ turn. If you know basic aerodynamics you can skip this section, and I don’t want to hear about anything I ‘leave out’ or ‘over-simplify’ in the comments if you don’t skip it. I’m not trying to ‘dumb it down’, I’m trying to leave out stuff I don’t need to explain to get to the larger points I’m trying to make.

‘Sustained Flight’ is the condition where airspeed, altitude, and load factor ”n” are all held constant. To be ‘constant’ Thrust “T” and Drag “D” must be equal, and Lift ‘L’ has to equal Weight ‘W’ x n. Straight and level (coordinated) flight is ‘sustained’ when lifting surfaces are level, the aircraft is not climbing or descending, neither is it accelerating or decelerating, and the bank angle is ‘zero’.

When flying straight and level, the load factor equals 1 (n = 1) as in “1 gravity” or 1g. But it is not actually ‘gravity’. The load factor n is dimensionless: the ratio of Lift to Weight (L/W), and each component has the same unit of measurement and are thus cancelled out (pounds/pounds, etc). Load factor is referred to in terms of ‘g’ because it is "perceived" as some ‘multiple’ of the acceleration of gravity on board the aircraft.

A ‘sustained turn’ is a turn where not only airspeed, altitude, and load factor ”n” are all held constant, but also the (non-zero) bank angle of the turn is held constant. To be ‘constant’, Thrust “T” and Drag “D” must still be equal, and Lift ‘L’ has to equal Weight ‘W’ x n, but ‘n’ is no longer equal to 1 because of the vector change of the aircraft as the turn is being executed.

For this exercise (and simplicity’s sake), we’ll assume the earth is ‘down’ and the aircraft is right side up (not inverted) and just say n is now greater than 1 (n > 1). For an aircraft with a typical wing-body-tail planform to enter and sustain the turn, the pilot/controller provides input to the control system that deflects the control surfaces to induce and then hold a bank angle, while increasing angle of attack needed to increase lift generated per unit of wing reference area to keep it equal to the load factor times the weight (n x W).

This means for any given set of airspeed, aircraft weight, and density altitude values, the load factor- accounted for in terms of ‘g’s- is a function of bank angle. Specifically, g= 1/cosØ. For example, a 60 degree bank angle (Ø=60), the ‘g’ value would be 1 divided by the cosine of 60, or 1/.5 = '2gs'.

60 Degrees Bank Angle and Resultant 2g Load Factor

Increase the bank angle, and in a steady level turn the g’s increase as well. As the use of a trigonometric function implies, and the chart below illustrates, the relationship is NOT linear.

'G's as a Function of Bank Angle

From the shape of the curve, we can easily observe that ‘g force’ begins increasing at a faster rate than the bank angle is increasing at around 3gs (if you remember your math, it is the point on the curve where the slope (m) of a line that is tangent to the curve = 1). By the time the typical ‘hot-fighter’ max g rating of 9g’s is reached, the bank angle has increased to about 82.6 degrees.

So what is ‘happening’ in the specific region of the curve where the F-35s ‘Sustained g’ spec change occurred?

Bank Angles: 4.6 vs. 5.3 Gs

The Only Conclusion: Bank Angles.

After that we need to start making 'assumptions'.

It doesn’t look like the airplane is doing anything too ‘different’ (minimal y axis delta) on the curve to get that ‘g’ difference, does it? That’s the first surprise waiting for people who haven’t thought much about ‘Gs’: the difference in bank angle between the two ‘levels of performance’ is about 1.6 degrees bank.

The difference looks like this:

Depending on airspeed, the bank angle could translate into a ‘small’ or a ‘large’ difference in turn rate and turn radius. Without knowing for certain what the weight, speed, and altitude is for the ‘performance standard’ at either 5.3g or 4.6g, the difference in bank angle between the two figures is all we can conclusively determine. Everything else depends on the missing data.

A Couple of ‘Likely Truths’

I’m pretty comfortable making some low-risk assumptions on top of the one conclusion. The first one is that F-35 max sustained G capability for the unknown flight conditions and configuration is actually somewhere in between the 5.3g and 4.6g values. I’m comfortable in doing so largely because the program has already demonstrated conservative programmatic behavior with the B model’s “take-off roll” spec change.

[History Sidebar: For the takeoff roll spec change, the JSF Program Office didn’t just ease the requirement to make it so the B model would ‘pass’. They changed the requirement such that it both met military need AND would allow for further ‘bad’ surprises without having to revisit the issue. Because of this past program decision, and just using common sense, I suspect the actual performance difference between the original spec and current performance is even less than all the complainers realize.]

The second assumption I’m willing to make--with only slightly less confidence--concerns which ‘limit’ was hit going for 5.3 sustained ‘g’s under those mystery (can’t repeat it enough) conditions. Max Sustained Turn limits are either “lift limited” or “thrust limited”. I believe the ‘thrust limit’ was hit versus lift limit, for a couple of reasons, and it is important to note now that ‘thrust limited’ can be viewed as either insufficient thrust for the drag experienced at the specified conditions (weight, speed, and altitude) or higher than expected drag at the specified conditions.

I would almost bet, but have no information to confirm, that the drag rise was higher than expected for the selected set of 'spec conditions'. I remind readers again, we have no direct information as to what those flight conditions were.

Exercise: Exploring Comparative Sustained Turn Rate Performance

If we are to do ANY comparison of the JSF performance with any other aircraft benchmarks we are going to have to make what some (no me) might call a small leap of faith and presume the weight, armament, and fuel loads as well as the altitude and airspeed are the same as what is commonly referred to at F-16.net as the ‘Bowman' Paper or Brief.

[Personal Note: If there is any Cosmic Justice in this world I predict it will befall CDR Bowman for ‘phoning it in’ on his Air Command and Golf paper and the superficial analyses and ‘pronouncements’ within. If he is still active duty when the time comes, I look for him to standup one of the early F-35 squadrons, if Navy assignment desks are half as evil as Air Force assignment desks.]

For the purposes of our exercise therefore, let us ASSUME (and we all know how that word parses) that the flight conditions and the aircraft configuration for the Sustained G spec is as follows:

60% Internal Fuel

2 AMRAAMS

15000 Ft Altitude

Mach .8 Airspeed

I will proceed only in evaluating the ‘G-Spec’ change for the F-35A model and let others make their own analyses on other variants and other comparisons than the ones I will make. I also caution against assuming that the results for those conditions and aircraft configuration translate linearly to any other set of conditions (they don’t) and against assuming that the actual performance at that set of conditions/configuration was the ‘best’ possible at any one of the given conditions. Just one of the weight, speed or altitude parameters could vary slightly and sustained turn performance could go up or down in a manner out of proportion to the change. I’ve also noticed that while the specs usually look at a .8M sustained turn, from at least the ‘F-15 forward’ the best sustained G for US fighters at 10,000-20,000 feet altitude seems to reside somewhere between .85M and .9M.

Keep these curves and data in mind when we move the discussion forward in the next post:

F-15 Turn Rates

These diagrams come from around the web and a personal reference I picked up at a used book store near Carswell JRB/Plant 4. The web sources are of uncertain provenance, but I found a good ref for the F-15 at a little different weight at 10K ft that correlates well to the F-15 data above. The F-18 data smells like public relations and is more nebulous. I can't tell you how many empty weight values I found for the F-18s, and early in the program the Navy was absolutely anal about couching internal fuel weights as fuel fraction percentages instead of just how much fuel would be carried internally.

The F-16 Blk15 is a good reference-probably the best available-as it has all that vaunted maneuverability the 'reformers' bemoan as ruined with later, heavier versions. The F-4 is a good data point because we have a distinct configuration attached to the performance numbers, and some disparage the F-35 as 'F-4 like'. The Mirage was interesting to me because it is a contemporary of the F-16 and represented the pinnacle of the delta-winged dogfighter (I remember reports of its debut at the Paris Air Show quoting a USAF General as saying "The French have finally perfected the F-106") until the Euro-canards started rolling off the line. In a perfect world, Sukhoi and Eurofighter will e-mail me their E-M diagrams before I go to press on the next post.

I expect the next post to cause a furball all of its own.

Since we’re working with ‘pictures’ and NOT real data, I’ve had to do some translating which may have brought associated minor errors with it. I don’t see anything remarkably out of place at the moment:

Aircraft Performance and Configuration Data Translated From Curves

If anyone has problems with the table I’ve assembled below using the charts above, and can come up with either better authoritative released data or good reasons why I shouldn’t use this data, I’ll leave the door open to changes for a couple of days while I finish doing the 'turn rate' and other math.

I predict that analysis of the data, combined with certain ‘truths’ about what level of significance should be attached to differences in sustained turn rates, and other things we know about the F-35 and have already covered concerning Energy-Maneuverability in an earlier post will clearly indicate we should be thinking of the F-35 as probably being a ‘competent’ if not ‘solid’ “kinetic” dogfighter and definitely NOT ‘a Dog’ (as people who have 'agendas' or little understanding of 21st Century air combat and aircraft design would lead us to believe).

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Colin Clark: "Cost Estimates" and the F-35

May 1, 2013, 6:56 pm

≫ Next: A Minor Note Concerning F-35B 'Bring Back' Weight

≪ Previous: The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change

Great article by Colin Clark at AOL Defense. Clark captures what weapon system 'cost estimates' really "mean" better than I've read anywhere else in the press.

If you can't visualize 55 years of Operations, don't pretend to be offended by the costs.

The 'F-35 H8ers' are no doubt dissing the F-35 and the article (and probably my comment on the thread come to think about it) as I type, but go, as they say,read it all here.

,,,and I can't post this graphic too often:

How the Anti-Defense 'Reformers' Practice 'Slash and Whine'

P.S. I'm almost done with Part 2 of the "F-35 G-Spec change" posts. Research is done. Crunching numbers now and will write it up soon.

Update 4 May: If I seem a trifle rough on some of the commenters at the AOL link, so be it. I cannot abide regurgitators of myths, poseurs, or what the Soviets used to refer to as the "govnoed".

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A Minor Note Concerning F-35B 'Bring Back' Weight

May 10, 2013, 8:49 am

≫ Next: The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change: Part 2

≪ Previous: Colin Clark: "Cost Estimates" and the F-35

The UK's National Audit Office has a report out called "Carrier Strike: The 2012 reversion decision". In the report, the findings are generally positive: The UK switching back to the B model is seen overall as a "good thing". That should be the end of the story. But.....

If someone didn't know squat about the science of flight, military flight operations, and the relevant physics involved, that someone-- and I'm not saying who -- might be tempted to cherry-pick a certain paragraph in a lame attempt to paint a new operational fact of life (now being dealt with) that comes with increased STOVL capabilities as a 'problem' with the F-35B. The "offending" report paragraph that 'might' be distorted 'might' be (emphasis mine):

3.10 An important enabler of the UK’s STOVL Carrier Strike capability will be the ability to conduct Ship-borne Rolling Vertical Landings (SRVL). This landing technique will be necessary where a conventional vertical landing is less likely to be possible without jettisoning large weapons or fuel load when in hot, humid or low pressure weather conditions. At present the technology is not proven with redesigns required to the carrier deck and aircraft software. The capability will be required for operations by 2020 and the Department included a provision to complete development as part of the cost of reverting to STOVL. The Department is confident it will develop the technique within the required timescale.

Fine (and 'Dandy')!

If someone were to pervert the above into something like: "The report says that the F-35B will have no vertical landing ability in hot, high density altitude, low pressure situations “without having to jettison heavy loads”, it might -once again- be helpful to provide some perspective showing that it is something new the F-35 program has to deal with because the ability to bring back a significant weapons load in all but the most benign conditions by a STOVL aircraft has never been possible before .

Let's take a look at the performance of the highest performing STOVL aircraft the F-35B is replacing: the AV-8B. From the AV-8B's Standard Aircraft Characteristics publication NAVAIR 00-110AV8-4 (1986), we first find the important 'weights' for the AV-8B:

The first key weight we'll note is the 'operating weight': 13,086 lbs. Now let's look at the maximum landing weights versus temperature chart for the AV-8B. The 'wet' thrust is assuming the water injection system was not used on takeoff, but on a hot day, we'll see later that this is pretty much a non-factor:

The first thing these two charts tell us is that you aren't going to be vertically landing so much as vertically crash-landing the AV-8B on a 'hot' day unless you are on fumes with NO payload. Even then it is going to be 'sporty' to say the least:

But the really wild thing here is if you are operating off a deck afloat in the 'tropics' you had to do a rolling takeoff, using about 90%+ of the available flight deck, and you were only able to do it if you had 40 knots of wind over the deck. With less deck or wind you weren't leaving with what you wanted to take with you in the first place. You'd have to leave fuel behind and 'tank up' en route.

From this last graphic, we can see chances are that on a heavy-hot-high mission, the AV-8B probably used its water injection system just taking off.

We can also infer that the current rolling takeoff spec for the F-35B of "600 foot" allows growth for much higher takeoff weights. This should make development of the "Ship-borne Rolling Vertical Landings" (SRVLs) an irresistibly attractive option for the USMC: If you can takeoff with 'more' you want to be able to land with 'more'. I suspect that the USMC will probably be on board with the concept before the Brits even begin operations. Pursuit of an SRVL recovery method is clearly more about eventually fielding MORE capability than currently planned and NOT about preserving current projected capabilities.

The whole idea of vertical 'bring back' weight is mostly about meeting a 'cost' objective by lowering operating costs incurred by jettisoning stores and is NOT and never has been an 'operational' problem. The weights under what conditions were selected almost certainly on a cost/benefit basis. I would assume either the number of days in a F-35B's operating life where temperature and humidity would conspire to affect the normal 'bring back' weights as negligible or the cost to allow for them exorbitant. Otherwise, the requirement would have been factored into the specs in the first place.

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The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change: Part 2

May 18, 2013, 10:01 pm

≫ Next: The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change: Part 3

≪ Previous: A Minor Note Concerning F-35B 'Bring Back' Weight

I want to reiterate that this series of posts is for the purpose of developing an understanding of aircraft performance parameters and the factors that influence them. It is not at all about providing answers (we don’t have enough relevant information about the aircraft we’re surveying, much less how they were/are or will be employed) but it is about how to THINK about the questions in the first place.

Let’s begin this post with an updated version of the table I showed the last time:

Selected Legacy Aircraft Configurations

I’ve added an ‘F-18C Light’ configuration to the mix because I found enough information graphed in a General Dynamics handbook on Fighter Performance from a 1985 Fighter Weapons Symposium (FWS). The book is a recent find of mine from a used book store very near the old GD, now Lockheed Martin plant: the same Plant 4 where F-35 output is being ramped up and boutique batches of F-16s still issue forth form time to time. From what I can tell, General Dynamics hosted this event and distributed material to operational F-16 squadrons around the world for years.

GD fighter Weapon Symposium "Fighter Performance" Handbook, Circa 1986

We’ll take the sustained G numbers from the charts for the aircraft configurations above and then crank out the sustained turn rates and similar numbers for a hypothetical F-35A ‘Bowman’ configuration and operating conditions. We'll use the upper and lower bounds of possible F-35A Sustained G values (between 4.6 to 5.3) to give us a range of possible sustained turn rates for that F-35 configuration/set of conditions/assumptions. The formula is:

Turn Rate =Velocity Squared /(G *tan Ø); where Ø is still, as shown in the previous post, the “bank angle”.

Note that I include 5.3gs as the upper boundary partly because we do not know how close the F-35 came to meeting that spec, but more because we know the ‘grade’ must be against some weight that includes some fixed aircraft dry weight, and we do not know how ‘light’ or ‘heavy’ the F-35 will be until after the final weight accounting that is sometime in the future. Right now, per the latest DOT&E report, we know as late as December the F-35A was nearly 1% below the projected weight needed to meet performance specs. If it comes in below spec weight, it will have sustained turn performance higher than what is currently ‘predicted’ based upon the spec weight.

F-35A_H Sustained Turn Rates Derived From Possible Range of 'Sustained G' Capability of 'Bowman Configuration' (Corrected**)

**Table corrected to show only difference between 'High' and 'Low' F-35A_H is assumed Sustained G performance boundaries

We now have the high and low boundaries for the possible raw sustained turn rate for our hypothetical F-35 (To keep things concise, let’s call it the ‘F-35A_H’ from now on in this series) and can compare it to the derived Sustained Turn rates for our selected legacy aircraft configurations:

Sustained Turn: F-35A_H vs Legacy Aircraft

Don’t Go There

I presume the above is the kind of raw comparison that sets simple minds down the ‘F-35 can’t turn’ path. Don’t go there – you don’t know enough about what matters…yet. The next thing we need to do is highlight the relative importance or unimportance of the differences shown.

Since we are using the boundaries of our F-35A_H performance in covering the range of possible performance, I’m going to present the ‘low’ boundary evaluation first (Remember, among other things, we don’t really ‘know’ the altitude at which this spec change was applied, we are ‘assuming’ for 'learning' purposes only):

Sustained Turn: F-35A_H (Low) Estimation Vs. Legacy Aircraft

Determining Turn Rate Parity, Superiority and Dominance

The rules used for assignment of comparative parity, superiority, and dominance ranges above and to follow are not mine. Consulting Raymer* (page 105) provided me with my first indication:

An aircraft designed for air-to-air dogfighting must be capable of high turn rate. This parameter dѱ/dt or ѱ, will determine the outcome of the dogfight if the aircraft and pilots are evenly matched otherwise. When air-to-air missiles are in use, the first aircraft to turn towards the other aircraft enough to launch a missile will probably win. In a guns-only dogfight, the aircraft with the higher turn rate will be able to maneuver behind the other. A turn rate superiority of 2 deg/s is considered significant.

*Aircraft Design: A Conceptual Approach 3^rd Edition; D.P. Raymer;AIAA Education Series; 1999.

I had originally intended to use the ‘2 deg/s’ standard to evaluate which aircraft had ‘significant’ advantage over others when, in reviewing my ‘Fighter Performance’ handbook, I found an expansion on Raymer’s observations:

Sustained Turn Rate Equality, Superiority and Dominance

I can’t find the basis for the yardstick stated by Raymer and expanded upon in the FWS handbook, but I imagine it has to do with the typical engagement segment duration where a sustained turn difference would typically yield a ‘significant’ or even ‘dominant’ advantage.

Using the same methodology for our upper bound F-35A_H (High) configuration we find the F-35 fares quite a bit better in the comparison:

Sustained Turn: F-35A_H (High) Estimation Vs. Legacy Aircraft

So in closing Part 2, we see that the possible range of the 'Bowman' F-35A_H's Sustained G performance is broad enough that if the actual F-35 performance is just a little better than the new Sustained G spec value, it will yield turn rates on a "par" with all but the F-15C and F-16A. If the actual performance is closer to the 'old' spec, the F-35A_H configuration we have modeled comes much closer to "parity" with our F-15C and F-16A configurations.

"What If"? (Parts 3 and 4)

These comparisons are rather static and one-dimensional and the relationships can change dramatically with changes to the armament and fuel carried. It is instructive to note the very large difference in F-18C sustained turn-rate performance based on the variation in weight (which is why I included the 'F-18C Light' data in the first place). Now consider the 'Bowman Configuration' assumption of 60% fuel on board for the F-35 also means that the F-35A_H's fuel load, as a fraction of the total weight, appears to be significantly larger than any of the other aircraft we are comparing. This hints that there may be equally 'realistic' if not more realistic F-35A configurations with far higher sustained turn capability than is attainable at the 'Bowman' weights.

I think it will be worthwhile (and fun) to look at things from a ‘1 v 1’ perspective with the two extremes of possible comparisons in our selected group: F-35A_H vs. the F-4E, and F-35A_H vs. the F-16A, and exploring the 'what ifs' of having slightly different configurations in our comparisons. I anticipate (but won't know until I get there) that I will be illustrating the F-4E at very light weights is not to be trifled with, and that the F-35A, when using comparable fuel weights, based upon equivalent fuel needs will be seen to have solidly 'respectable' sustained turn performance in comparison to other modern aircraft.

Part 3 will look at the F-35A_H vs F-4E.

BONUS GRAPHIC

From the Fighter Weapons Symposium Handbook, we see that the F-16A is/was about the 'cream of the crop' when it comes to Sustained G turns:

Sustained G: Thrust to Weight Matters Too

So do you think the latest Sukhois do any better? IMHO they're probably more to the right on the X-axis but not any higher on the Y-axis compared to the 'old' Su-27s.

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The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change: Part 3

May 26, 2013, 11:47 am

≫ Next: The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change: Part 4 (of 4)

≪ Previous: The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change: Part 2

F-4E vs F-35: The F-35 does not have F-4 'like' Sustained Turn Performance
I selected the F-4E for one of two comparisons for a reason beside the fact that it represents the low end of aircraft data in hand: This is to be and Anti-(Not to be confused with ‘Counter’) Propaganda post. When I read a Golden-Armed Meat Servo quoted claiming the F-35 had 1950s ‘F-4 like’ turn performance based solely on the sustained turn spec change, I had to chuckle at the use of ‘misleading vividness’ and ‘damning with faint praise’ in reference to a comparison with the venerable F-4 . I wonder if such bluster was scripted for him by another meat-servo (generic) working in the Boeing Business Development Office? I wonder, because it is a good ‘hook’ of a sound bite for the ‘low-information’ public…but a pretty stupid one when you get down into details.

The F-4 in Our Analysis

The F-4E in our comparison isn’t a product of just the 1950s, But one of progressive improvement from the 1950s through the 1970s. The F-4 design was constantly tweaked throughout its operational life. It has been observed that the F-4 had seven different wings over its evolution through about 1980 if you count the test canard-equipped F-4 configuration (Bennett and Rouseau, 1980), and I believe the AF’s leading edge slat (LES) configuration was wing #4 or #5.

The ultimate USAF F-4E dogfighter IMHO, was the ‘slat-bird’ with TISEO, a far different aircraft than even the Non-Slat F-4E configuration that my late Father-in-Law flew in Vietnam (or the non-slat F-4Es we in the 57th FIS were still flying out of Keflavik Iceland in the early 80’s).

Eventually, all serving USAF F-4Es would get the LES treatment, and it was for good reason. Wind tunnel data for the Post-Vietnam LES wing had predicted a remarkable improvement in controllability (Hollingsworth and Cohen, 1971):

From "Determination of F-4 Aircraft Transonic Buffet Characteristics"; E. G. Hollingsworth, M. Cohen, Journal of Aircraft; Vol 8, No. 10; October 1971.

…and when the design was first executed on the YF-4E, flight test validated those significant improvements (Hollingsworth and Cohen):

From "Determination of F-4 Aircraft Transonic Buffet Characteristics"; E. G. Hollingsworth, M. Cohen, Journal of Aircraft; Vol 8, No. 10; October 1971.

Col Robin Olds smote “highly maneuverable” MiGs while flying comparatively less agile and capable F-4Ds. Think about what he could have done in a F-4E ‘Slat Bird’.

From the charts above we find the basic aerodynamics of the late model F-4E are clearly ‘superior’ (even using our grading methods) to the 1950’s or 1960s F-4 image that still resides in most people’s minds. From history, we know that it was lethal when in capable hands against far more 'agile' aircraft of its day.

Now we will take note of the specific weight and drag circumstances used for the F-4 in our comparison.

Source: GD fighter Weapon Symposium "Fighter Performance" Handbook, Circa 1986

The configuration of our F-4E (50% internal fuel, 2 AIM-9s and 2 AIM-7s, and a nose load of 20mm) closely describes a fighter that is either 1) on a short range point defense mission, 2) or has dropped its wing tanks a “half-internal fuel load” ago. Either way, it seems the F-4 we describe had better be on its way home or to a tanker pretty soon on ‘Mil’ power if it hopes to make it back to his base.

The F4-E in our static ( i.e. “snapshot”) comparison has a sustained G turn rate slightly above the F-35A_H (Low) boundary configuration. How might that change if we lowered the F-35A_H fuel load to something comparable to the F-4E’s? By ‘comparable’ I do not mean ‘the same’, I mean a fuel load that will allow the F-35A_H to fly as long or far as an F-4. This "apples to apples" comparison can be reasonably estimated.

While the F-4E in its modeled configuration is no doubt 'lightweight', it does have a slight but measurable sustained turn advantage compared to our representative F-35A_H(Low) but is at a greater disadvantage against the F-35A_H (High) boundary configuration. It must be remembered the later-generation fighters have tailored-airfoil wing designs developed using Computational Fluid Dynamics to wring as much efficiency as possible and with blended fuselage-wing profiles would be superior to a wing using a catalog airfoil or airfoils (In the case of the F-4, it uses a modified NACA 0006.4-64 airfoil at the wing root transitioning to a modified NACA 0003-64 airfoil at the tips, Source) The F-35A_H in our example now assumes a far higher fuel fraction of total weight in fuel is onboard than the F-4E example. What if we reduced the amount of fuel on the F-35 to be more operationally equivalent to the F-4E’s fuel load?

Normalizing the ‘Fighting Weight’

We can adjust the fuel fraction of the F-35 by adjusting fuel carried (downward) to approximate the equivalent fuel of the F-4. What is important is to closely approximate the fuel on board the F-35 that is an ‘equivalent’ needed by the F-35. I’m going to avoid quantifying the ‘time element’ up front and use it later as a "punch line". In making the adjustments, let us give as much benefit of the doubt as possible to the F-4E example. Two of the biggest benefits of first building a ‘worst case’ scenario in parametric modeling for studies that I perform are 1) If a solution is an obvious one, even with everything ‘going against it’ it is easy to get even Management on board with the solution and 2) If the solution is an obvious one I don’t have to do any more excursions – it’s a great time saver.

Our Assumptions:
1) We assume the F-4 has no higher drag/’total thrust’ ratio than the F-35A_H while maneuvering, though the F-4E is heavier and the overall F-4 design was originally optimized for intercepts at higher altitudes and supersonic speeds and has a less efficient (for maneuvering at lower altitudes) ‘catalog’ higher aspect-ratio wing (modified NACA 0006.4-64 at the wing root and NACA 0003-64 at the wingtip ).
2) The Specific Fuel Consumption (SFC: pounds of fuel per hour-pound of thrust) at all throttle settings is assumed to be equivalent between the two aircraft. Besides having a much older J79-17 engine design in the F-4E, there is no FADEC as in the F-35A_H. Though the J79 engines in the F-4 may have a very slightly lower SFC in afterburner than the F-35A_H’s F135 engine, they will have significantly higher SFC in Mil Power (Max throttle no Afterburner)—these are typical differences between turbojets and turbofan engines.
3) Since the F-35A_H has higher thrust-to-weight in Mil Power AND Afterburner and a much higher Mil Power/Afterburner ratio, the higher efficiency of the F135 is even more apparent, but we will ignore that higher efficiency in our analysis and call it ‘a draw’.

So if we assume the drag/total thrust ratio and fuel efficiency (SFC) are equivalent between the two aircraft, all we now have to do is account for the disparity in non-fuel weight and thrust ratings. The F-4s fuel fraction in this modeled configuration is about 14.5%. To get the same fuel fraction in the F-35A_H, we would reduce the fuel carried from about 11800 lbs to about 5120 lbs. But since we assume we need all that extra thrust in the F-35A_H to do the same amount of ‘work’ as the F-4E, we need to add enough fuel back into the F-35A_H to ensure it has the same relative endurance as the F-4E. The F-35A_H has slightly more than 26% more thrust than the F-43 (43000 lbs vs 34000 lbs), so we will increase our assumed F-35A_H fuel load by adding that same percentage to the intermediate 5120 lb value to arrive at an “F-4 equivalent” fuel load for the F-35A_H of 6474 lbs.

Note that by using the higher 43K pounds of thrust figure vs. any lower thrust value, we are requiring our F-35A_H to carry more fuel than otherwise. Again, this is done to give the F-4E every possible benefit before deriving sustained G turn rates in our comparison. Our two contender’s configurations in this excursion are therefore as identified in the table below.

Normalized Fuel Weights and Configurations for Comparing F-4E and F35A_H

F-35A_H Sustained Turn Performance at F-4E Equivalent Fuel Loads

We can now use these numbers to derive the estimated changes to the range of possible “Sustained-G Turn” capability for the F-35A_H. The nice thing about 'sustained turns' for doing this kind of extrapolation is that we are dealing with states of equilibrium. We can take the 'g' load and multiply by the aircraft weight to arrive at the total Load Factor and equivalent lift required. At a lighter weight, the same lift and total load is achieved at a higher bank angle and the same load divided by the new lighter weight yields a higher g-rating. As the aircraft is still flying at same speed and altitude, which requires the same wing performance/ efficiencies which have the same drag effects in our region of operation.

Use the figure from Part 1 (left) to visualize the force vector relationships and how they change as the weight is decreased. If the dark blue weight 'vector' is smaller, to get the same equivalent lift and load factor found at max turn and heavier weight, the bank angle is greater.

The only assumption I am making in this case is that the Center of Gravity (CG) shift is not a factor. If the CG shifts forward or aft because of the weight difference, there may be some variation, but modern aircraft are designed to optimize the CG as fuel burns down, so this factor is ignored.

The F-35A_H Sustained turn bang angle and 'G' boundaries we used earlier for the higher weight assumption thus shift noticeably higher when the F-35A_H fuel load is reduced to something comparable to the modeled F-4E configuration.

The High and Low Boundaries of the F-35A_H Sustained G Turn Capability Increases
Dramatically When Aircraft is Loaded Comparable to the F-4E Configuration.

This higher bank angle at the same .8 Mach at 15K feet altitude operating conditions thus increase the range of possible Sustained Turn rates of our F-35A_H accordingly:

F-35A_H Sustained Turn Rate Range at F-4E Equivalent Fuel Load.

F-35A Sustained Turn Capability: Clearly NOT ‘F-4 like’

It should be obvious to even those most critical of the F-35 that I could have made a slew of small errors at the margins in this analysis and it wouldn’t have significantly changed the end result. When configured at “apples to apples” operating weights, the F-35A_H clearly outclasses the F-4E. We can say that at these configurations, the F-35A_H is "better" to "superior" in comparison to the F-4E.

Nails in the F-4E’s Coffin

The F-35 airfoil efficiency is also not reduced by external stores in its ‘Day 1’ configuration. With its superior fuel load the F-35 can 1) pick and choose the time to engage, probably without the F-4 ever knowing it was there and 2) capitalize on its superior thrust/weight ratio and better controllability at higher angles of attack (AoAs) .
In addition, if you refer to the E-M diagrams in the previous post and above, you will observe that the bleed rate ‘isobars’ for the F-4 in a turning condition are much closer together than for aircraft in later generations. I suspect the F-35’s E-M diagram looks much more similar to later generation fighters than the F-4’s.

The Final Nail: Fuel Consumption

If we refer to the ‘Dash-1” flight manual for the F-4E and view the combat fuel consumption plots, we find several important bits of information.

1. The plots assume supersonic wing-level flight.

2. The plots show a range of fuel consumption: from minimum afterburner to maximum afterburner and for an ICAO ‘standard day’ as well as a 10 degree warmer day.

3. The plot for the closest configuration to the F-4E configuration we are using is the for 4 x AIM-7s instead of the 2 x AIM-7 and 2 x AIM-9. But that’s OK, because the AIM-7 carriage is lower drag than the AIM-9 on the F-4 (Pylons and launcher on wing vs. semi-conformal on fuselage) so we have another negative we ignore to give benefit to the F-4E in the comparison.

This is the plot:

F-4E Combat Fuel Burn Plot

The Punch Line

Now, while our F-4E versus F-35A_H ‘engagement’ wouldn’t be straight and level and above Mach .8 much less Mach 1.1 (the lowest speed at 15k Ft with Min Afterburner In the plot), the fuel burn rate in afterburner is still relevant, and likely still very optimistic for our purposes, as the F-4E would certainly be using higher-rate afterburner settings in such an engagement. So to giving more benefit of the doubt to the F-4E, and assuming it was using only the minimum afterburner to maneuver against a more powerful and lighter F-35, we get to the ‘punch line’ I alluded to earlier:

720 lbs/minute fuel burn rate and 6020 lbs of fuel on board = about 8 minutes 20 seconds before the F-4 crashes, hits a tanker, or lands.

That’s assuming all the fuel on board is usable, though it is not. From this fact alone, it should be obvious to the reader that the F-4E configuration that could theoretically compete with an F-35 in a “sustained turn” competition was “infeasible”—an F-4E “strawman” that was good for highlighting that even with every advantage, and flying as light and slick as possible, the F-4 sustained turn rate doesn’t quite match up to more modern aircraft. I suspect that was the entire purpose of including it in the Fighter Weapon System Symposium materials in the first place: a benchmark to compare against the F-16 that was designed to make the F-16 ‘look good’.

Next in Part 4: F-35A_H vs. the F-16A Sustained Turn Performance. What will we find?

↧

The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change: Part 4 (of 4)

June 30, 2013, 2:46 pm

≫ Next: Pierre Sprey: Expert?

≪ Previous: The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change: Part 3

Note: See Part 1, Part 2 andPart 3 for flight conditions, and important background information.

Let’s get into the hard numbers right from the start in this comparison as I’m sure no one expects our F-35A_H in any configuration to surpass the F-16A in the ‘lightweight’ (50% internal fuel, minimal armament) configuration we’re using:

F-16A Configuration Baseline

As a reminder, here is the sustained G difference between the two:

Sustained Gs: Spec F-35A_H vs. Lightly Loaded F-16A

In the chart above we find, the F-35A_H baseline shows the possible ‘high , ‘low’ and range in between of possible values compared to the much-vaunted F-16A’s performance.

The other expressions of turning ability that fall out from these values are Bank Angle:

Bank Angle: Spec F-35A_H vs. Lightly Loaded F-16A

…and of course "Sustained Turn Rate" expressed in Degrees per Second:

Sustained Turn Rate: Spec F-35A_H vs. Lightly Loaded F-16A

Clearly, the F-16A configuration's sustained turn performance, even compared to the best possible F-35A_H turn rate at 'spec' weight, goes beyond 'Superior' and approaches the level of 'Dominance'. This indicates it would be pretty stupid for an F-35 driver to get in a protracted turning fight with an F-16A if each combatant needed to get behind the other to 'get the kill'.

But what about a turning fight when the F-35A_H weight is at other likely F-35A_H values?

To parallel the process we followed in comparing the F-35A_H with the F-4, I’ve selected some feasible alternative loaded weight F-35A_H configurations to compare the possible performance of the F-35A_H with our lightly-loaded F-16A:

Three F-35A_H Load Configurations. (*Assumes fuel burn is constant when in reality as weight goes down fuel burn rate goes down in 'cruise'. Using this assumption, the F-35 is actually penalized: retaining more fuel than needed than the F-16.)

As you can see, Case A will be an F-35A_H with the same fuel load fraction (50%) as the F-16A’s. Case B adjusts the F-35A_H fuel load to yield an equivalent thrust-to-weight ratio as the same F-16A in the 50% Fuel Load configuration. Case C is a little more nebulous, but my ground rule assumption that fuel burn is constant though the weights are going down penalizes the F-35 more than the F-16, this is my ‘best estimate’ of what equivalent fuel loads would be for the airplanes to each be able to fly 500 nm at 30k feet to get back to their home bases. Even if my Case C range assumption is off, both fuel loads are realistic for a possible aerial encounter some distance from home base. Case B and C are remarkably close to each other, but still produce differences in performance:
Looking at all three cases, using the same formulas and physics as we've applied in Parts 1-3, the ranges of possible F-35A_H’s turn performance for comparison to the Lightweight F-16A are found:

Three F-35A_H Configurations: Three Ranges of Possible Turn Performance

Here are the ranges of possible F-35A_H sustained turn rate performance for these three cases, when charted against the F-16A’s 50% Fuel Load Configuration performance:

Three F-35A_H Configurations: Closer to F-16A's Light Configuration Turn Performance

Thus we can see that 30-40% of the possible values for the F-35A_H in Case A (50% Fuel Load) would place the F-35A_H in relative parity (less than 2 Degrees/Sec, see part 2) with the F-16A, and there are fewer, but still ‘some’ possible values for Cases B and C that would also make the F-35A_H in ‘parity’ with the F-16A. Obviously from what we’ve seen so far, the lighter the fuel load, more likely the F-35A_H could be on a par with the lightly loaded F-16A when it comes to sustained turn performance.

Every Pound of Load Difference Affects Lighter Aircraft More than Heavier Aircraft

We’ve shown the F-35s sensitivity to fuel load in regards to turn performance, but the sensitivity of lighter aircraft to the proportionally similar fuel loads is even greater, as every pound of fuel represents a larger percentage change in the fuel fraction of the total weight. Observe the differences in performance between a full internal fuel load and a half-full internal fuel load on the F-16A:

Full Internal Fuel Reduces F-16A Sustained Turn Rate Considerably

A full internal fuel load, even with our ‘light’ F-16A weapons load brings the sustained turn rate performance of the F-16A down significantly. What if our ‘Spec’ loaded F-35A_H was compared to the an “F-16A-like” aircraft carrying full internal fuel. Envision the “F-16A-like” aircraft had just jettisoned its external fuel tanks to do combat with our F-35A_H carrying 60% internal (and total) fuel.

How would the turn performance of the two aircraft compare? It would look like this:

Sustained Turn Rates: F-35A_H Baseline vs. Full Internal Fuel F-16A

Over half (~2/3rds) of the possible sustained turn rates for our F-35A_H Baseline aircraft are on a par with an F-16A carrying a full internal fuel load.

What does a comparison of our Case A, B and C configurations with a full internal fuel-loaded F-16A look like? That comparison looks like this:

F-16A 'Like' Aircraft With Full Internal Fuel Vs. Lighter F-35A_H Configurations (Fixed F-16A Label)

From this chart we see that ALL possible sustained turn rate values for the F-35A_H using any of the three selected fuel load cases are on a par with our ‘full internal fuel load’ F-16A.

Conclusion:

Depending on amount of fuel carried by each aircraft, the F-35A is capable of sustained turn performance on a par with the F-16A. Assuming the F-16A is still the ‘best’ in a sustained turn that there’s ever been at 15K feet and M.8, then that means the F-35A is capable of holding its own against all comers in a sustained turn when flown properly in competent hands.

This would be a lot more exciting news if Sustained Turn Rates were still as important today as they were before the advent of the All-Aspect missile attack. I wonder what technical performance metric the critics will criticize next?

Closing:

Why This Topic and Why Now? The impetus for this mini-series of posts springs from all the things that seemed to be hitting the headlines while I was out having a life (of sorts) away from the web. Things like the usual POGO Clown Posse faux alarm protestations that arose in response to the recent F-35 performance spec changes: Protestations that were then flung like monkey-you-know-what by the usual suspects for consumption by the innumerate and ill-informed around the globe. Further, once industry and defense pilots who’ve actually, y’ know, FLOWN one or more of the three F-35 versions-- probably in response to the flingin’—got a little vocal with positive comments on the F-35’s maneuverability, the ‘Anti’ crowd and business scavengers went DEFCON1 trying to drown them out.

I see the next couple of years as make or break for the F-35….critics.

The number of F-35 pilots will reach critical mass in this timeframe, and the Anti-JSF'ers know that once that happens, unless the plane really IS a bust, no amount of hyperbole and lying coming from POGO and its fellow travelers will be able to sustain a false 'image of failure' for the F-35.

The increasing desperation of the anti-defense, anti-JSF action-network is palpable…and delicious. But their outrageous claims must still be contested with facts, and their Misleading Vividness must be undone by sober observations. They must be contested lest their deceptions gain any real traction or (equally undesirable), their deceptions provide cover to others who would kill the F-35 for their own evil, or more likely, ignorant and misguided motives who would use the F-35 misinformation as a useful tool.

What Next on the F-35 Front?

With the F-35 numbers in the field climbing, expect the ‘Reform’ types to focus on generating “Cost! Cost! Cost!” misconceptions more than on technical performance topics. It doesn't mean every little glitch won’t get a snarky article posted someplace in the manner of targets of opportunity, but that won’t be their primary focus.

↧

Pierre Sprey: Expert?

July 4, 2013, 1:12 pm

≫ Next: There Be Some Naughty Cuba-NoKo Arms Goings-on Here

≪ Previous: The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change: Part 4 (of 4)

Pffft! More Like POGO's 'Circus Barker'

(File Under "Know Your Reformer")
Hat tip 'munny' at F-16.net

Pierre Sprey: Old Whine in a Cracked Bottle

There's a new You Tube Video (link here) up with Pierre Sprey blathering his usual nonsense about 'complex' vs 'simple', 'heavy' vs. 'lightweight' fighter performance... blah... blah... blah. As if he ever knew d*ck about the topic at hand. Virtually everything he says is just as wrong or worse than the first time he spouted it off. Remember, this is all part of the POGO P.A.C.E. propaganda strategy.

I left a few comments that were smaller than I would've liked because the format doesn't allow me to put together a larger coherent one such as:

Pierre Sprey has never ‘designed’ anything with wings, and he still doesn’t know diddley-squat about aircraft design OR air warfare . He played a bit role in developing top level requirements at OSD for a couple of years, basically parroting whatever John Boyd or Everest Riccione were hawking that day. His ‘expertise’, as well as much that which is claimed about the rest of the so-called ‘Reformers’ was pure fabrication by James Fallows. Those fabrications have been echoing in the halls of the anti-defense lairs for consumption by the useful idiots ever since.
Best summary* of Sprey I’ve read:

While working on the F-X, Boyd met Pierre Sprey, a weapons system analyst on the OASD/SA staff, whose background was similar to [Alain] Enthoven’s but much less distinguished. By his own account, Sprey was a dilettante with an engineering degree but no military experience. After graduation from Yale, Sprey became a research analyst at the Grumman Aircraft Corporation for space and commercial transportation projects. He came to OSD/SA in 1966, where he declared himself an expert on military fighter aircraft, despite his lack of experience. Sprey admitted being a gadfly, a nuisance, and an automatic opponent of any program he was not a part of.

*Source: Pierre Sprey, Oral History Interview by Jacob Neufeld, 12 June 1971, K.239.0152-969, AFHRA, 9, passim. , as cited in THE REVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM, Marshall L. Michel III, 2006 (PDF).

Michel gets a little too 'Fighter Pilot Uber Alles' in his thesis, and I found myself having to force my eyes to read past those parts, but it still is a good read. If you want to read a really cold-blooded delivery of a takedown concerning the so-called ‘reformers’--including Sprey-- buy and read “Military Reform: the high-tech debate in tactical air forces” by Walter Kross.

Clearly POGO is focused on Canada as a 'weak link' in the JSF coalition at this time.

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There Be Some Naughty Cuba-NoKo Arms Goings-on Here

July 16, 2013, 6:39 pm

≫ Next: The F-35 Issue: 'Food' for Thought?

≪ Previous: Pierre Sprey: Expert?

Arrrrgh! A NoKo "Fan Song Swan Song"?

This is developing fast! The BBC and others report "North Korean ship with 'military cargo' held by Panama"

The Ship? The delightfully named "Chong Chon Gang" .

First reports just mentioned 'missiles' and 'missile tech' with pics, the text suggesting possible missile containers:

Military Contraband Hidden under 'Cuban Raw Sugar'

But that didn't look like a 'missile container to me, what with those 'parts' attached to it like we see in the picture. This looked vaguely familiar.....Kind of like a piece of this (in red):

Backside of Fan Song Radar

If you still can't 'see' the resemblance, how about if I clip, flip and magnify the detail?

Fan Song Detail, Flipped Upside Down

See the resemblance now?

Details emerging:
1. Allegedly (wink wink, nudge, nudge) there was an 'anonymous tip' about some drug smuggling.
2. Chong Chon Gang crew resisted Panamanian forces when they tried to board.
3. The NoKo freighter's Captain had a 'heart attack', and has now tried to commit suicide.
4. Seeing 'Fan Song' radar 'dish' showing up in some articles now.

The 'Fan Song' is an oldie but a goodie, usually associated with the SA-2 missile system, which with upgrades can still be a nasty piece of trouble for even modern jets. A description of the Vietnam Era system:

An S-Band FAN SONG radar is installed in one of the centrally located vans and provides target position data to a computer. It also has the added task of providing individual target position data on as many as three missiles. It must do this at the same time as it is providing target information to a system computer. The requirement for a single radar to track and lock on to as many as four targets simultaneously necessitates that the radar continually look at several points in space. This requirement implies that the FAN SONG searches, or scans, at the same time that it locks on to, or tracks, several targets. This was in fact the case. The FAN SONG technique of locking on while searching is called Track-While-Scan.

The target tracking data that the FAN SONG radar must provide to the missile computer is azimuth, elevation and range. To provide this information, the FAN SONG has two transmitters operating at different frequencies, each feeding an antenna. One antenna produces a sectoring azimuth beam and the other a sectoring elevation beam. The dimensions of each of the beams are 2 degrees by 10 degrees. The 2-degree wide, 10-degree high azimuth beam is scanned right to left for 20 degrees. The 2-by-10-degree elevation beam is scanned up and down 20 degrees. The two sweeping beams intersect to cover a 10-by-10-degree sector. Source

Newer versions are believed to be more capable. I'll bet this deal was a 'complicated' one to start with, and it just got more complicated.

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The F-35 Issue: 'Food' for Thought?

July 21, 2013, 10:02 pm

≫ Next: F-35 Price Dropping Again: Too Bad, So Sad...

≪ Previous: There Be Some Naughty Cuba-NoKo Arms Goings-on Here

No. Thin Intellectual Gruel

Someone in Italy named 'Gherardo Albano' has an internet ‘editorial’ up that was linked to by AV Week (for some unfathomable reason). The title: “The F-35 Issue: Food for Thought”.

But the intellectual gruel he offers is so thin, that if it were real food, an anorexic supermodel wouldn’t bother to throw it back up. It is so bad, I decided to Fisk it here for posterity. The editorial is in italics. My comments are in purple.

We begin....

These days there’s a big discussion on whether Italy should buy 90 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning IIs. The aim of this article is to analyze the overall picture within which such an important decision should be taken. In particular, there are two separate fields of analysis, one purely military and another related to economic issues. Let’s analyze them separately.

Sounds acceptable for the purposes of sharing information…so far. I note here, however that we must remember that ‘Economic’ Power is an equal to Military Power as two of a Nation’s Elements of Power. They support each other and the Nation itself.

Military matters
From a strategic point of view, at the moment, it is not foreseeable that a crisis may result in a conventional war. ...

Whoa! Stop. Right. There.

Rarely does an author open an argument with a logical fallacy, in this case a “Non Sequitur”. Usually, employers of this tactic try to lull an audience into a stupor before they try to slip one of these by their readers. Note: There’s a dash of “Begging the question” here as well, where something is first expressed as a presumed truth, and then later used to fallaciously support a claim or conclusion.

Casual readers, especially those of a like-mind with an author, might still miss his use of this logical fallacy because it is executed en passant; carefully avoiding the unwritten non sequitur (“it does not follow”). The ‘does not follow’ part isn’t expressed, but is presumed as unspoken fact to support the arguments that will soon follow.
I wonder if the author has legal training because this has the flavor of an ‘opening argument’, otherwise I have to doubt the author was even aware of his transgression. This does not bode well for the rest of the opinion piece, for it hints that the author is a ‘true believer’ of some sort. The only question is: a ‘true believer’ in “what?”. My main concern at this point now is how much will Albano’s remaining argumentation will rest on ‘beliefs’ instead of ‘facts’?
The ‘does not follow’ part? The fact that “it is not foreseeable that a crisis may result in a conventional war” does not preclude an ‘unforseen’ conventional war. It does not follow that because one cannot envision a conflict, a conflict will not arise. In fact, History tends to tell us that the wars we ‘see coming’ are often the wars we are able to sidestep…into the wars we don’t see coming and that usually bite us in the end. I think my first question to the author at this point would be “How many years before Operation Allied Force or even the recent military intervention in Libya, did you ‘foresee’ either/both of the conflicts coming?” The second would be “Why didn’t you do something to prevent them?”

…Of course this does not mean that we can dismantle the entire military. Defense continues to be necessary to every nation, in the present geopolitical framework, including peaceful countries such as Switzerland and Sweden, and certainly cannot be dismantled if it cannot be restored quickly in case of emergency.

Ahh! Pabulum designed to allay fears concerning the author’s reasonableness: An observation that only the most rabid anarchist or peacenik might find objectionable. Are we being ‘lulled’?

As far as we are concerned, the Italian Air Force now has a line of flight divided between air defense, consisting of about 72 Eurofighter Typhoon, and attack, consisting of 36 AMX International AMX and 48 Panavia Tornado PA-200. Then there are of course all the other non-combat operational units like tactical transport, refuelers, rescue, VIP transport, training, and so on. The Italian Navy has about 15 McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II Plus aircraft characterized by the ability of short take-off — the vertical take-off is militarily marginal — and short or vertical landing. This capability is an essential but expensive element of protection of the fleet which makes it different from most of the other navies in the world.

The audience is thus presented with a description of how the author, using a ‘Royal We’ editorial style, views and mentally organizes the Italian Navy and Air Force. I have no problem with the explanation, except perhaps the last sentence. It makes an assertion that may or may not be true as to the uniqueness of the Italian STOVL capability and relevance to the fleet.
But the assertion is completely unsupported, and I imagine there are several arguments that might be made against it (one comes immediately to mind). I note here that I wouldn’t disagree with the author on this point. The last sentence expresses a presumption the readers are expected to simply accept as ‘fact’.
We will see later that this sets up a ‘STOVL capability of the F-35B will be essential because I say it is essential’ argument: the author presents more build up to his “begging the question” fallacy.

The combat aircraft lineup is now a dim memory of what it was in the eighties, when during the Cold War there were more than 200 aircraft for air defense and 350 for the attack role. They have already been reduced due to the organic decrease of the external threat. What remains can be considered a core of resources, human, material and methodological facilities to maintain the expertise, knowledge, methodologies and a minimum of military capability in case the need arises.

I have no major problem with this part except the view of ‘military capability’ as expressed is rather sophomoric. The confused taxonomy listing ‘military capability’, which is a combination of knowledge (expertise), methodologies (along with missing ‘hardware’ and ‘doctrine’), in the list itself may be a translation error. I believe a far better ‘book’ definition of military capability can be found in the definition of the Military Element of a nation’s power.

It is clear therefore that cutting or reducing it further would mean loosing [sic] a capability that needs between 5 to 10 years to build up again if a serious threat becomes visible. Italy would rebuild their forces almost from scratch hoping to have the time to do it. New combat-ready rookie pilots would need about 5 years. Ordering, receiving and organizing for new aircraft, performing maintenance, recruiting technicians, would again require between 5 and 10 years. In the case of the Navy, rebuilding would take much longer if we were to lose the aircraft carriers.

No. And though I’m tempted to go into excruciating detail why ALL of the author’s imagined timelines to reconstitute a force are pure hokum, I will resist the urge and merely point out the timelines appear to focus only on a time to train up the end-use operator/maintainer. Even if you get a cadre of “new combat-ready rookie” pilots in 5 years (a highly suspect assumption as-- unlike the children of Lake Wobegone-- not all fighter pilots are ‘above average’), how long will it take to train up enough force leaders that have the experience and knowledge/skills and doctrinal support to lead them?
I’ll call this “B.S.” but am willing to retract same if anyone can show me a contemporary peacetime military organization that has developed, fielded and employed an advanced military capability after replacing an existing capability much less creating a new capability in under 10 years…. ”successfully”. The 5-10 year time span offered clearly provides nothing for the organizational, doctrinal and infrastructure development required to actually field and execute military power by a modern homogenous society, much less a Western democracy as fractured politically as Italy (or the U.S.A. for that matter).

The above considerations lead me to say that maintaining a capacity in the defense sector by replacing aircraft that reach the end of service life with more modern and competitive aircraft (relative to hostile forces) is a crucial need. The alternative would be a great risk for our country given the current geo-political instability worldwide.

Other than the “above considerations” shouldn’t lead anyone anywhere, this may seem reasonable…on the surface.
We will soon see how the author defines “more modern and competitive aircraft”. Guess what he leaves out or diminishes? Any bets they involve aspects of combat aircraft design that F-35 was built upon?

The attack aircraft in question will still need to be replaced over the next 6-12 years for reasons of obsolescence and useful life. The older a plane becomes, like a car, the more maintenance costs until the situation becomes untenable.

This is what is known as the “setup”. I always look for this part on a point of argument. It is where your debate opposition states something he doesn’t expect an argument over then delivers a contrarian ‘but’, as in “Yes. Blah blah blah, but XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.” Some of the best advice I ever received was from an Air Force Lt Col (Engineer) during TASVAL79 who told me: “Always remember Mac, everything before the ‘But’ is Bullsh*t. The setup indicates we are about to be spoon-fed the Bullsh*t.
Also note the author lists “obsolescence” and “useful life” yet only just touches on one aspect of the impacts at the end of “useful life”.

The current situation is the following:
• The AMX are technologically obsolete and should be replaced soon;

I’ll buy that, but for reasons I already know. WHY does the author think they (or the other aircraft for that matter) are “technologically obsolete”? It seems the author is twisting himself into contortions avoiding the details concerning what makes a fighter aircraft “obsolete”.

• Tornadoes are being updated and this standard can last another five-ten years or even more;

Even if it were true, 5-10 years is ‘tomorrow’ even if you have a replacement in hand. I note (again) the author is using a form of “begging the question”: we are expected to accept his claim is ‘true’ because he states it as a ‘truth’.

• AV-8B Navy aircraft have 20 years of operating life and do not need to be replaced now, but in the medium term, unless unexpected problems of maintenance arise.

Assuming the Italian AV-8’s haven’t been flown into the ground and won’t be in the future, I’ll buy 20 years on the airframe durability. But an airplane is far more than just the airframe, and the author somehow fails to mention the relative obsolescence of the AV-8 design itself.
I’ll not pursue the hole in the author’s argument for now, except to first ask: “What makes this author ignore the fact that like all pre-5th Generation aircraft, obsolescence will probably overcome the aircraft before they are ever close to being worn out?”
Oh, and about the authors last turn of the phrase using the weasel words “unless unexpected problems of maintenance arise”: In my 40+ years of aerospace experience “unexpected problems of maintenance” have never failed to “arise”. Why assume otherwise?

Let’s see now what could be the alternative having already narrowed down to the most plausible hypothesis:

Has anyone seen any ‘narrowing down’ yet? I didn’t either.

1. replace the strike aircraft with the F-35 variants A and B, taking into account that B is the only possible replacement for the Navy’s AV-8B as there are no other STOVL aircraft types;
2. replace the AV-8B with F-35B and all others with more Typhoon, Tranche 3, which have advanced attack capabilities.

What happened to #3? After all, it is only the freakin' ‘current plan’:
3. replace the AV-8B with F-35B and the AMX/Tornados with the F-35A. If the author sees fit to ignore the current plan, why then shouldn’t we also consider an expansion on that plan to come up with a ‘#4’?:
4. retire some/all Typhoons in recognition of the inherent Air-to-Air capability that F-35As bring to the Air-to-Air fight.

This suggests that for the Navy it is important to buy the F-35B while the Air Force has in fact two possible choices. Let us see the features of the two possible candidates.

Well, since the author saw fit to selectively attenuate his list of options ahead of time, of course he would reach this conclusion.

The development program for the F-35 is not proceeding well. …

“Not proceeding well”. One may argue the point using the “as compared to what?” other modern (last 50 years) and similarly advanced technical development efforts or even to simply other large, highly complex, government programs-- as the F-35 program fall into both categories. I would therefore challenge Mr. Albano to name one program in either category that did/has not experienced as many or more challenges than the F-35 program. I also challenge him to name any of them that did a better job of dealing with them than the F-35 program has to-date. This is the kind of simplistic thought that makes my Aerospace Engineer blood boil. But on the plus side, it provides me yet another opportunity to quote a favorite: J. R. Pierce.

Novices in mathematics, science, or engineering are forever demanding infallible, universal, mechanical methods for solving problems.

(I never tire of referencing Dr. Pierce)

… Let’s say that there were basic errors: starting production of the plane when the development was still in progress and the desire to develop three versions — Standard A, B vertical take-off, C for aircraft carriers with catapult — from a single basic design coming to affect all versions with the requirements of the most difficult vertical take-off version. This has led to a significant increase in costs and the forced relaxation of specifications to be met, without which the project would had [sic] been unfeasible. …

“Let’s say?”—This is yet another ‘Begging the Question’ logical fallacy, only this one is a ‘twofer’: two popular, yet unsubstantiated/perverted criticisms in one. They are: 1) ‘Concurrency’ and 2) ‘STOVL Requirements adversely affected CTOL and CV designs’.
1. Concurrency.‘Some’ claim concurrent development increases cost and schedule. This assertion on the F-35 has become a rather popular ‘political’ truth, but it is still not an actual truth. ‘Concurrency’ when studied by those with expertise to do so has consistently been shown to benefit advanced programs, and IMHO I’ve adequately covered this topic many times on many web domains, but have dealt with it most completely in 2011 in my Congressional Bloviation on Concurrency post, so I will not go into detail again here. But I will note that the post stands up well, especially in light of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics testifying before Congress just a month ago that “Concurrency costs are coming down faster than program estimates, and production costs are coming down as well.”
2. STOVL Requirements adversely affected CTOL and CV designs. This is perhaps one of the most tiresome canards propagated by the anti-JSF crowd. ALL aircraft design involves tradeoffs. In the case of the F-35, the dominant tradeoffs were made between the requirements to perform air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. In all the assertions that the F-35’s design was ‘compromised’ somehow because of the STOVL requirement, I have not once read once ‘how’ the design was allegedly ‘compromised’.
The author can’t name one any more than any other before him. The most dominant ‘F-35B unique’ requirement in the total design effort was ‘low weight’ in support of the STOVL operation. If anything that requirement drove better F-35 CTOL/CV designs as well. There are perhaps some dimensioning restrictions in the design for ship-borne operations, but even with those the most a critic could claim is that they ‘might’ have driven a different (not necessarily better) design than the F-35A model would have been as a standalone design.
NOTE: from this point forward, Albano’s opinion piece really starts rambling all over the place so I will be inserting comments in brackets as often as possible. If his thoughts were better organized, I would have been finished yesterday. If I don’t use brackets […], I would have to chop up his sentences as well as his paragraphs, making it even tougher for the reader to follow.

… In any case we are talking about a highly advanced aircraft not only for the use of new stealth technology — which basically means opposing radar has difficulty in detection — but also for new production technologies and the integration of a lot of electronics called sensor fusion — to put it simply, allowing better awareness of the situation around the aircraft.

Mr. Albano obviously has no idea how important Low Observables and F-35-grade Sensor Fusion are to the modern air combat equation judging by how this entire piece is written. The “difficulty in detection” is a “damning with faint praise” fallacy. Low Observability disrupts the entire kill chain at every step, from attempts to detect to terminal weapon end game, and forces an opponent to have to begin the process all over again when the chain is broken.

The program currently sees continuation of testing, and the manufacture of aircraft is not yet at the minimum standard for combat.[So? Is this a recognition of an already recognized ‘risk’?]In short, the aircraft to the current date is not satisfactory[It is still in LRIP, Duh!],but over time it will be excellent in the attack role. It will remain however, in my opinion, insufficient in the role of air defense, since it hasn’t a powerful enough radar.[“However” is another form of “But”--See earlier note on that topic. As to “not powerful enough”, Mr. Albano has no idea know how “powerful” it is. I also seriously doubt he has any idea how the whole of F-35 ‘Sensor Fusion’ is greater than the sum of its parts, including the AESA.]

In addition, currently the F-35 can only carry two anti-aircraft missiles when in stealth mode and this severely limits the ability to deal with numerous enemy formations[Patently false. Current plans call for maximum of 4 internal A2A missiles, with provisions for more. The capability supports very favorable projected exchange loss ratios, so Albano’s “opinion” which based on who-knows-what misinformation is of no consequence].Kinematic capabilities also contribute to a poor verdict on its air to air performances. [More opinion based upon….what? There isn’t enough information in the public domain for outsiders to pass judgment on the subject, only conjecture.]
Cost for purchase and maintenance remains to be firmly determined, which will be discussed later.

Count the internally-carried Air-to-Air missiles in the baseline plan...

Yes, it is all just ‘estimates’ now. Just like the future costs of any aircraft, even ones that are now flying, So?.

The alternative to the F-35A is the Typhoon, a European project which is already mature owing to further development with the so-called Tranche 3 (T3) that Italy should acquire, funds permitting, to complete the line of air defense.[Italy isn’t buying the F-35 to replace the Typhoon in the Air Superiority mission, so what is Albano’s point?]The T3 develops the plane incorporating a new type of AESA radar and new types of weapons for air-to-air and air-to-ground combat, increasing significantly the military value and configuring it as a true multi-role aircraft. The Typhoon does not have stealth technology, but has top rated kinematic capabilities — speed, acceleration, turning — and self-defense exceeding the F-35. [No. See earlier comment about kinematics and exchange rates]For comparison a Typhoon has at least six missile, has wider antenna coverage and can go higher and faster.

'Wider’ antenna coverage? Does he mean scan angle? Is he talking about the current or future EFA radar? In any case this can be countered by the F-35 changing operational techniques, so “So What?”. The Typhoon is far more observable at every range and angle with far less situational awareness than an F-35. It can go higher and faster than an F-35… sometimes. Such as when it’s not carrying any significant go-to-war payload.

The plane on the left can carry two 2K lb precision weapons and 2 Air-to-Air Missiles to 50K ft+ and fly 1000+ nm and dash at M1.6 in this configuration. The plane on the right with the same load? Not so much.

A comparison of the F-35 and Typhoon T3 must be set to a period of the useful life of about 30 years which brings me to the following considerations:

1. the F-35 is more technologically advanced and this is reflected in a number of benefits including that in the next 10-15 years, a further development potential is possible to adapt the plane to new threats;

Ah. Cherry-picking a timeframe. How about for the next 30-40 years? The Typhoon conceptual design is already 30 years old, based on even older requirements and designed for a different (pre-stealth) age. It will be lucky if it is viable in any scenario in 15 years.

2. the stealth technology is the F-35′s primary means of protection from interception, but there are many plans to reduce the effectiveness of this technology and high maintenance costs of stealth protection is a sustainability issue;

I’ve lost count of the assumptions, myths and half truths presented in Albano’s piece as ‘fact’ that we’re expected to accept. These are two more.
First: Low Observability. LO is a combination of technology, techniques and tactics. It is no more ‘static’ than the efforts to defeat it, and it is always developed and applied with an eye towards of continuous improvement. This is yet another case where someone with no actual background assumes the LO an aircraft starts with, is the LO it ends with. We do pre-planned product improvements on all aircraft systems, and operational techniques always evolve over time, What makes anyone think LO is any different? Albano needs to start someplace on this topic, so he can start here, and I’ve already provided the link to Grant’s Radar Game.
Second: LO High Cost of maintenance. Mr. Albano has obviously missed all the discussions on how the F-35 had LO supportability designed-in based upon experiences of the past. If he were a serious student of maintainability and supportability, he would have observed that in all the reports that have criticized the F-35 to-date, there have been none -- zero, zilch, nada -- that have criticized the F-35 Sortie Generation Rates. You don’t get the SGR you are looking for if you have excessive maintenance burdens of any type.

3. Italy overall has few aircraft and multi-role capability, although not a main requirement, will definitely have value. In this respect, the Typhoon is great for air defense while the F-35 is marginal;

Need I point out that Albano is again ‘begging the question’? And over a point tangential to the reasons the Italians are buying F-35s in the first place? I’d like to also pose the question as to “How great are you at air defense?”, if low observable opponents will most likely ‘see’ you before ‘you’ see them?

4. in the attack role the F-35 is invaluable in the event of a confrontation with technologically advanced opponents in the early days of the war when air defenses are fully functional; when the fight shifts to trucking bombs, the two aircraft are substantially equal.

‘Substantially equal’? This is ‘begging the question’ again. Does the Typhoon have anything like the F-35’s ability to distinguish friend from foe on a fluid battlefield? Does the Typhoon have anything that provides a pilot with a clear view of the target in the day, night, in any direction and in all weather conditions? More importantly, can the Typhoon do so with a reasonable expectation of not being successfully engaged by Surface-to-Air threat? As proven in Operation Allied Force, where the Serbians elected to shepherd their air defense resources, you can never be certain to have eliminated the Surface to Air threat, you can only have varying degrees of confidence you have been able to attrit/mitigate it. Flying a non-LO aircraft over hostile territory is an invitation to eventually get shot down. How “equal’ a bomb-truck can a Typhoon be if attrition is factored in? Answer: not very equal at all.

A singleflight line on the Typhoon would have major economic benefits for training, spare parts and so forth while the same proposition cannot be said for the F-35 since it is not an interceptor.

We now see Albano, having praised the secondary strike capability of a Typhoon, making no examination of the F-35’s capabilities in the Air-to-Air mission. While no doubt the F-35 would have to perform the mission differently than a Typhoon (the Typhoon’s great top speed in a relatively clean configuration is a direct product of the ‘Interceptor’ mission requirement),it has not been shown that the F-35 could not perform the mission. If viewed as a ‘fleet’ vs. ‘individual fighter capability’ could an argument be made that an “all F-35” fleet in greater, same, or fewer total numbers than a combined F-35/Typhoon fleet could perform both A-A and A-G roles? Has Albano reduced this effort to a EFA Typhoon advocacy paper?

In the future, industries are developing unmanned combat aircraft vehicle (UCAV) stealth such as the X-47B. These are designed, much like the F-35, to carry out attacks in extremely dangerous air defences. Therefore, the specific strength of the F-35 could in the future be better carried out by a European UCAV.

The X-47B just now completed the technology demonstration step in the combat UAV evolution. Whatever the follow-on program produces if it even materializes, it will still be only the first step on a long journey that will take several generations of developments, and still, it may never make the manned combat aircraft 'obsolete'. File this under ‘wishful thinking’.

Regarding the choice of the Air Force to ask for 60 F-35As and 15 F-35Bs, I consider that, assuming we stick to the F-35, the best solution would be to buy all F-35As because: the B version costs 30% more than the A; is, performance wise, inferior to the A version; but most importantly because the operational motivation is rather weak. In fact, the F-35Bs were required by the Air Force to be used in support of expeditionary situations where adequate runways are not available. If this is the need, then it would be more effective to use F-35As for the Navy, considering an increased purchase to 20. To save money, in case of F-35 purchase, a unified management of today’s separate lines of flight of the two armed forces, including training, should be enforced.

This part is so disjointed I hardly know where to begin. First the F-35B is essential for the Navy because it can operate off the Cavour. Now the Navy should buy land based versions? The author’s ‘logic’ holds only if the Navy never goes farther asea than where the land-based F-35As can support it. While throwing around a ‘30% higher cost’ number is Albano aware that the STOVL sortie generation rate specification is about 33% higher than the F-35A or F-35C? What ‘costs’ are he using to compare F-35A and F-35B unit costs? Is he aware the program is managed to minimize total life cycle costs instead of initial procurement unit costs? Is he aware that in a 25-30 year weapon system lifetime, typically 2/3rds of total costs are in sustainment?

Economic and industrial matters
The Typhoon is a plane in which the domestic industry’s original share — design and production — was 21%, but in the case of additional, future purchases may be negotiated higher.[Very nice. Good luck with that. How many future EFA sales are expected? A large percentage of “very little” is ‘not much’. ]Also with the manufacturer of the Typhoon consortium, in case of additional purchases, or beyond the commitments entered into with the consortium, you could negotiate a package of financial compensation even exceeding 100%, just like the big world buyers (India, Brazil, Korea, etc.). In addition, the extension of the production of the Typhoon could lead to further sales abroad, with additional financial benefits for Italy.

In light of the procurement history and dearth of potential customers, that sounds like an awful lot of wishful-thinking to me. The Eurofighter program cost and schedule history make the F-35 look like a model acquisition program.

In contrast, the Italian share of the F-35 project is 4% for Development and is not assessable for the production, as the supply tenders are still in progress. Italy has invested over the years about 1 million U.S. dollars in the development of the F-35 and so did Finmeccanica partnering with the MoD for the “FACO” in Cameri. We must consider that, while the percentage is lower, it is on a much larger number of planes and a hypothetical 4% of 2,000 aircraft is comparable with a 100% of 75 aircraft. Technologically, Italian companies are fully conversant with Typhoon production technologies while those of the F-35 are partially unknown. The original contribution to the development of the F-35 was finalized contingent on the acquisition of new technologies for Italian companies, but the U.S. has severely limited these knowledge transfers.[It should be noted here that is precisely the kind of criticism the F-16 Multinational program dealt with in the early days. We must observe that the technological benefits received by the partner nations brought most of them back for more with the F-35. This smacks of frustration borne on wings of unreasonable expectations.]In addition, if Italy will purchase F-35s, any national enhancement, update or integration cannot be performed without U.S. approval and involvement, so the F-35 should be considered a “limited sovereignty airplane”.

Not true. But a commonly repeated oversimplification often committed by people who ‘think’ they understand how the F-35 software design works. The author is apparently unfamiliar with MILS or EALS-7 . Users will be able to ‘nationalize’ their own aircraft if new systems and add weapons (the aerospace equivalent of adding an ‘App’) if they wish. But the idea behind the common core software design is to ensure commonality and in turn reduced software maintenance cost over the life of the program. Canada, Australia, and the UK are planning to jointly develop a ‘reprogramming laboratory’ of their own (page 77). There is nothing stopping Italy from doing the same on their own or in concert with another partner nation.

Both the UK and Israel have strongly opposed the American policy in this regard, but for now, only Israel has managed to get limited access to electronic systems in order to make partial integrations nationally. To better understand the implications, if tomorrow the Italian Air Force requires the integration of a weapon or an external tank, it would have to ask the U.S. to perform it, paying and waiting for their development cycles in which, predictably, they would not be a priority.[Again, NOT true (see above). But I suppose it is a convenient appeal to nationalism and trade protectionists]
On acquisition costs for the F-35, there is an extensive bibliography, made of figures difficult to compare and review — a real jungle — so if there are two numbers are one is double the other, they could be both true since they are based on different assumptions.[And include different cost items, or ‘different year’ currency values, or both. So what?]
In addition the F-35 is in the development stage and not yet in full production, having acquisition costs that vary from year to year. We now have, for the A model, an approximate figure well above $100 million. Flight costs per hour is also a topic for fortune tellers, but the numbers are scaring the USAF.['Scaring': A fallacious Appeal to Emotion directed at the uninformed]
The Typhoon is well known for acquisition and flight costs. [Not so much “well known” as seen as an outcome to be avoided]
Conclusions
In my view, the purchase of the F-35 should be only for the 15-20 copies for the Navy, to be purchased along a period of 7 to 10 years from now, allowing the maturation of the aircraft and the reduction in purchasing costs. To date, a fully operational aircraft is scheduled for 2019, if there are no serious problems on software development, a key component in the present day for a fighter plane. The Air Force, in contrast, has a technological option that makes it possible, even if with operational differences, to purchase the F-35A or the Typhoon.

Only if you actually believe the Typhoon will be effective and survivable for the next 30 years or so.

It is my opinion that it is useful, both economically and industrially, that Italy, since there are no orders signed besides 3 F-35As, reviews in detail the alternatives, requiring two offers, with guaranteed costs and industrial compensations, for the two alternatives: Typhoon T3 and F-35A. The timing for the purchase of the 75 aircraft, may be over a fairly long period and without immediate financial commitments. In case of confirmation of the F-35, it would be desirable that the purchases were delayed until 2018 to 2020, in time to start replacing the AMX.

Oh yes, because everything is always cheaper if you stretch out the purchase and do it later (/sarc).Apparently the author has never heard of Economic Order Quantities.

This would be a nice as we consider the current crisis that does not allow for non-essential digressions. Defense cannot be neglected, but we can certainly wait a few years before deciding and purchasing.

My Conclusion:
Mr. Albano’s screed is ill-conceived, poorly written, drivel. It remain so even when allowing for what must be lost in the English translation. He presents nothing more than a laundry list of unsubstantiated and/or perverted anti-JSF complaints with a dash of pro-Eurofighter ‘feelings’ (vs. fact). In law, it is said that if the facts are on your side then argue the facts. If the law is on your side, then argue the law. If you have neither the facts nor the law on your side, then ‘pound on the table’. Mr. Albano is clearly ‘pounding on the table’.

Veritas Locutus Est, Causa Finita Est

↧

F-35 Price Dropping Again: Too Bad, So Sad...

July 30, 2013, 7:21 pm

≫ Next: Remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki

≪ Previous: The F-35 Issue: 'Food' for Thought?

...for the F-35 Haters.

Have a quote from Colin Clark's latest at 'Breaking Defense: F-35 Prices Drop 8 Percent In $7 Billion Deal

“Cost details will be released once both contracts are finalized; however, in general, the unit prices for all three variants of the U.S. air vehicles in LRIP-6 are roughly four percent lower than the previous contract,” Lockheed and the Pentagon’s Joint Program Office said in a joint statement. “LRIP-7 air vehicle unit prices will show an additional four percent reduction. The LRIP-7 price represents about an eight percent reduction from the LRIP-5 contract signed in December 2012.”

The Anti-JSF crowd will no doubt play the 'not including engines' red herring. this usually includes taking a swipe at LockMart over not including the engine costs while NOT acknowledging:

1. The DoD buys/develops the engines separately. This has been the general practice pretty much since at least WW2. Lockmart has no real say in the matter.

2. The costs will still be lowering (in constant year dollars) over time if volume is allowed to increase. Even mouth-breathers should be able to grasp the idea that the lowliest 'econobox' Kia or Hyundai would cost a Gazillion Dollars each if you only built a handful a year.

Poseurs of lower intellect will also b*tch about hidden/other additional 'development costs'. This would only be ethical (or even accurate) if you also give credit for ALL benefit derived from other current and future applications of the technology/knowledge gained by F-35 development that does NOT involve the F-35. Which is for all practical purposes "unquantifiable", as knowledge does not expand along a nice linear progression that accountants so dearly love.

All is proceeding as I have forseen.

Sure, it's Photoshop now--But not for long...

↧

Remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki

August 7, 2013, 8:48 pm

≫ Next: F-35 CAPE B.S. Cost Estimates Proven to be.... B.S.

≪ Previous: F-35 Price Dropping Again: Too Bad, So Sad...

A most moral use of force.

H/T Instapundit

Glen Reynolds offers two excellent links to outstanding and most timely content content for our review and reflection.

The first, is from the late Paul Fussell, whom I've never quite forgiven for his little book "The Boys Crusade" (a 'stain' on an otherwise quite good collection of work IMHO), but I set that aside to recommend the 'Insta-linked' Thank God for the Atomic Bomb .

At the second link, Bill Whittle delivers a timeless, crushing body-blow to the 'revisionists' who grow bolder as age and time overtakes our WW2 veterans and their memories.

↧

F-35 CAPE B.S. Cost Estimates Proven to be.... B.S.

August 21, 2013, 7:15 pm

≫ Next: F-35 Cost Estimates Drop; AvWeek Makes Motorboat Sounds

≪ Previous: Remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Not that I told you so...But I told you so.

H/T Spudman at F-16.net and Colin Clark at AOL Breaking Defense

Just got home from work and I'm beat, but I can't let this one pass until tomorrow.

As regular readers, and those whom I encounter on the boards elsewhere (Hi there Vet Ops Analyst! ) already know, I've been pointing out the CAPE estimates for the F-35 have been bizarrely high for ~~months~~years now. You didn't have to be clairvoyant to know this, just observant (and I suppose a little experience and familiarity with the program and subject probably helps).

The fact that each production lot of F-35's has come in progressively further under the CAPE estimates and much closer to LM's projected Cost Curveshould have been a red flag to anyone without a bias against the F-35.

LRIP Production Costs Are Coming Down Fast: Pretty Much in Line With LM Estimates and Well Below CAPE Estimates

But until now, the CAPE estimates haven't been brought into serious question in the eyes of the media or the public. Perhaps this piece from Bloomberg will change things?

A fleet of Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT)’s F-35 fighters will cost $857 billion over 55 years to operate and support, 22 percent less than previously estimated, according to the head of the Pentagon office developing the plane.

The new estimate reflects the aircraft’s performance in 5,000 test flights over 7,000 hours, Air Force Lieutenant General Christopher Bogdan, the Defense Department’s program manager for the F-35, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in written answers last month that haven’t been made public until now.

Colin Clark has a little more info on the problem with the 'internals' of the CAPE estimate for the F-35B in particular with a link to a 'Bloomberg piece: Marines Put F-35B Flight Costs 17 Percent Lower Than OSD.

Best Bit:

Among the questionable assumptions Schmidle highlighted is this whopper: the Office of Secretary Defense estimate developed by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office (CAPE) predicted that the F-35B would be flown at full throttle in STOVL mode — which uses enormous amounts of fuel and utilizes the highly sophisticated lift fan system at much greater rates than the Marines project — about 80 percent of its time in the air.

Anyone who has watched the Harrier or the F-35B knows that Marines pilots rely sparingly on STOVL mode. It’s only used for a limited set of tactical moves and, usually, for taking off or landing the aircraft. The great majority of the plane’s flight time — could it be as much as 80 percent? — would be spent flying without using the lift fan and STOVL.

'Starry Night 2013'
CAPE O&S Cost Estimates Had (Have?) the F-35B Flying around in STOVL Mode at Full Throttle....
MOST of the Time.

Clark gives a hat tip to is an unusually informative Bloomberg piece (F-35 Support Costs Fall 22%, Pentagon Manager Estimates) by 'Slow Tony' Capaccio. Inside it we find:

"effort remains to continue to find cost efficiencies and reduce this number even further" and “I expect these cost estimates to continue to go down over the next several years as the program matures,” Bogdan said.

Jennifer Elzea, a spokeswoman for the cost-assessment office that compiled the earlier $1.1 trillion estimate, said in an e-mail that she couldn’t comment on Bogdan’s reduced projection.

Heh. Now we get to see how long it takes for the CAPE estimates to actually go down, now that their 'problematic' nature has been found out.. My bet is it will be done gracefully over time, IF they can get away with slow-rolling this discovery.

Production costs going down. Support costs going down. All is proceeding as I have foreseen.

↧

F-35 Cost Estimates Drop; AvWeek Makes Motorboat Sounds

August 22, 2013, 9:21 pm

≫ Next: F-35 Critics: Same Sh*t, Different Century

≪ Previous: F-35 CAPE B.S. Cost Estimates Proven to be.... B.S.

But...But...But...But...

Tonight, I was curious as to how Aviation Week's ARES Blog would cover the news that F-35 Sustainment cost estimates were being lowered dramatically, and how the CAPE estimates to-date apparently involved some wildly unrealistic Ground Rules and Assumptions (GR&As). I should have let that 'itch' pass.

I suspect AvWeek must have taken exception to getting scooped by 'Slow Tony' Capaccio on a big aviation story, the kind that perhaps they should have found first. I 'suspect' so because when I dropped in to see what they had written, all they had was Sean Meade's '8/22 Frago' link to someplace with the rather dismissive title: Analysis: Lower F-35 Operating Costs Should Be Taken with A Pinch of Salt.

I clicked on the link and...gasp! It was the oh so cogent (/sarc) Giovanni de Briganti I've taken to task before. I (or anyone else for that matter) could go to his faux aero-news website almost any day to find some low-hanging fruit to debunk, so I'm usually not even tempted to bother....unless a presumably 'authoritative' website points to it, and even then I've resisted because of the whole "fish/barrel" thing. As usual, there's A LOT wrong with de Brigante's nonsense, but because it's late, and it's not worth too much of my time to beat down on this kind of stupidity, I'll just note the most egregious nonsense I found in de Brigante's so-called 'analysis' has the added benefit of also being the easiest one to explain to John Q. Public. I quote (bold emphasis mine):

The Marine Corps has also radically changed its F-35 operations to claim lower costs. Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle, deputy Marine Corps commandant for aviation, told Reuters that the Marines would fly their F-35Bs “in STOVL mode just 10 percent of the time, far less often than the 80 percent rate factored into the initial estimates.” ...

...If STOVL is needed only 10% of the time, then it is, at best, a secondary capability, and is no longer enough to justify the F-35B variant’s exorbitant cost, both in terms of acquisition ($153 million, without engine, in LRIP Lot 5) and of operations ($41,000 per flight hour).

Furthermore, if STOVL operations are limited to 10% of flight activities, it is hard to see how Marine pilots will ever gain enough experience to fly STOVL missions from small, unprepared landing zones on the beachhead – the main, if not only, reason the Marine Corps says the F-35B is indispensable.

Wow. Just. Wow. Let us note that Lt. Gen. Schmidle said they would be flying their F-35Bs (get ready to look for the key word here) “in STOVL MODEjust 10 percent of the time".

STOVL "Modes" are for Doing 2 Things

And you only want to be in a "STOVL Mode" when you are doing those two things. Can you guess what they are Mr. de Brigante? No?

How about 'take off'.....

100th Short Takeoff
Source: LM Aero Code One Magazine

and 'land'?

BF-4's First Vertical Landing
Source: LM Aero Code One Magazine

Want to guess about what percentage of a normal sortie is spent taking off and landing? Way less than 10%. Which tells me the Marines will be practicing those STOVL takeoffs and landings quite a bit more than de Brigante's so-called 'analysis' was able to identify. Pffft. Not much of an analysis.

de Brigante's 'logic' above is akin to telling you that your car doesn't need brakes 90% of the time, so that must mean you don't need brakes.

Seriously AvWeek?

You don't even cover the cost estimate reduction news, but you point to a juvenile attempt to diminish positive F-35 Program news.

I remember when Aviation Week was run by grownups for the aerospace community. Now?
Welcome to...

Frago Rock: Like another enterprise with a lot of silly nonsense, but with very little singing.

~Sigh~

↧

F-35 Critics: Same Sh*t, Different Century

August 28, 2013, 8:00 pm

≫ Next: And Now For Something Completely Different Part 1

≪ Previous: F-35 Cost Estimates Drop; AvWeek Makes Motorboat Sounds

Stop Me if You’ve Heard This One Before

(Update with the missing bits filled in and additional content after the original post below)

Fill in the Blanks:

Despite its ability to dominate the XX arena, the F-XX attracted a vocal and influential group of detractors who continued to fight a battle for small, cheap dogfighters. Gathering advocates from several walks of life, a splinter group of congressmen, journalists, aircraft designers, former fighter pilots, and military analysts marched under the banner of XX XX XX XX to demonstrate the folly of the F-XX…

...The XX who focused on money saw the F-XX as too expensive at $XX million, seven times the cost of an F-XX and twenty times the cost of an F-XX. They further argued that the airplane was XX XX and easy to XX that the pilot of a XX F-XX XX fighter could easily get inside the F-XX pilot’s OODA loop and wreak havoc. Ironically, the very argument XX XX used proved the case against them. The XX was XX, but its XX and superb XX not only gave the F–XX pilot the first chance to observe, orient, and decide, they also gave him the first chance to act. The XX had good arguments, but they were based on old information. A new paradigm XX XX, and it was the paradigm of a very large battlefield, with reliable missiles that could truly “reach out and touch someone.”

Hint: There is no correlation to word length and number of X's, 'XX' was used for every blank.

I’ll fill in the gap and blanks, along with the paragraph that followed and a link to the source tomorrow night.

Everything about warfare changes over time,,,,except 'man'

And yes, I meant for the panorama pic to 'go wide'. Everything was too small otherwise

*********End of Original Post :: Update Below*********

The original of the excerpt above at the source reads:

Despite its ability to dominate the aerial arena, the F–15 attracted a vocal and influential group of detractors who continued to fight a battle for small, cheap dogfighters. Gathering advocates from several walks of life, a splinter group of congressmen, journalists, aircraft designers, former fighter pilots, and military analysts marched under the banner of the Military Reform Caucus to demonstrate the folly of the F–15. James Fallows eloquently expressed their credo in his best-selling book, National Defense. The reformers who focused on money saw the F–15 as too expensive at $20 million, seven times the cost of an F–4 and twenty times the cost of an F–5. They further argued that the airplane was so big and easy to see that the pilot of a small F–5-sized fighter could easily get inside the F–15 pilot’s OODA loop and wreak havoc. Ironically, the very argument the reformers used proved the case against them. The Eagle was big, but its radar and superb missiles not only gave the F–15 pilot the first chance to observe, orient, and decide, they also gave him the first chance to act. The reformers had good arguments, but they were based on old information. A new paradigm was emerging, and it was the paradigm of a very large battlefield, with reliable missiles that could truly “reach out and touch someone.”

From: SIERRA HOTEL: FLYI NG AIR FORCE FIGHTERS IN THE DECADE AFTER VIET AM by C.R. Anderegg., Pg 164.

What immediately followed the above was of interest as well:

This did not mean that the day of thedogfight was over—far from it.

Aggressors often found a way to deceive and befuddle Eagle pilots, and the huge F–15s could end up in a tiny furball with the little F–5s. Nonetheless, the battle arena was getting larger, and the training was improving as dissimilar air combat training spread to every Air Force fighter unit. To many, the issue was starting to change from who had the best hands to who had the best head. A new fighter force with new jets, new missiles, and new ideas was starting to define the parameters for aerial combat at the end of the twentieth century.

I've never heard anyone knowledgeable on the subject ever claim that the close in dogfight will never happen - It's just that now it will happen only after a lot of other things that you have to worry about first, that will kill you first, just to even get to the 'merge'

“If you come straight down the snot locker today, I will shoot two Sparrows at you and call you dead. If I am out of Sparrows, I will rip your lips off with a Lima [AIM-9L]before you can get to the merge. Questions?”

In reading Anderegg's accounts (written in 1999) of the relative dogfighting capabilities of the F-4, F-16 and F-15, there is a passage (pg.163) of particular interest to me:

At the F–4 Fighter Weapons School, Larry Keith and his band of radical, firebrand tactical thinkers—led by Joe Bob Phillips, Ron Keys, John Jumper, Dick Myers, Buzz Buzze, Tom Dyches, Jack Sornberger, Dave Dellwardt, and others—pressed hard to devise scenarios that honored the threat of a Sparrow streaking out at long range. Theirs was a losing battle, though, because the Sparrow’s record was dismal on the F–4. In the early 1970s, if an F–4 pilot briefed his adversary that a Sparrow shot from ten miles would be counted as a kill, he would be laughed out of the briefing room with hoots of “Get a grip,” or “You need a tally on reality.”

Gradually, though, the impact of the F–15’s combat capabilities started to sink in across the fighter forces. When F–15s from Langley went to Eglin to shoot missiles in WSEP over the Gulf, the AIM–7F success rate was four to five times higher than it had been on the F–4. Even more astounding was the success rate for the AIM–9L, which confirmed the engineers’ hopes for a one-shot-one-kill weapon.

It was a good thing the F–15 systems proved to be reliable at long range, because the aircraft sometimes did not do well in the classic, roiling dogfights. The F–15 was more powerful and more agile than any other fighter in the world. However, it was also the biggest fighter and very easy to see. When nose on, it had a relatively low visual profile, but as soon as it began turning, its enormous wing could be seen for miles. Some called it the “flying tennis court;” others called it “Big Bird.” F–4 pilots and WSOs licked their chops at the opportunity to get in a fight with Eagles before the F–15 got the Lima. The WSOs especially made no effort to hide their disdain for the new, single-seat jet. One Langley F–15 pilot went on a tour of F–4 bases to brief crews on what the new Eagle could do.

He was stunned to find that F–4 back-seaters at every stop could only focus on how the new jet would die wholesale in combat because it did not have that extra set of eyes to watch for threats.

Ultimately, the Eagle pilots could not be denied. They started walking into briefing rooms and telling their adversaries, “If you come straight down the snot locker today, I will shoot two Sparrows at you and call you dead. If I am out of Sparrows, I will rip your lips off with a Lima before you can get to the merge. Questions?"

In response, adversaries studied the lessons learned by AIMVAL-ACEVAL pilots on how to survive in an all-aspect missile environment. As the reliability of the missiles improved, the culture of long-range missiles slowly spread throughout the fighter force. Of course, clever pilots developed ways to defeat some of the long-range shots, but as they devised one counter, the F–15s developed new techniques based on the lessons of formation discipline, radio discipline, radar discipline, and shot discipline learned in the weapons schools and at ACEVALAIMVAL. The cycle of counter vs. counter vs. counter continued, but the fight did not start at 1,000 feet range as in the days of “40-second Boyd.” The struggle was starting while the adversaries were thirty miles apart, and the F–15 pilots were seriously intent on killing every adversary pre-merge.

The above (and the rest of Sierra Hotel) was interesting to me this time around for different reasons than the first time I read it. It is a fair summary of the difference between air combat capabilities in John Boyd's era and the present. If you read the whole book and a few other sources, you come to start clicking off in your mind things about the F-22 and F-35 that bring the fight to an even higher level. Things like what enables F-16s to even find F-15s in the first place to get a first visual is the radar and ground/AWACs control. This is not an option against the F-22 or F-35 if you are not flying in a 5th Gen fighter. Another is the ability of the F-35 to track, sort, an maintain contact with far more targets at one time without losing lock in the merge: the F-35's sensor fusion removes the ability of one 'Red Force' opponent to 'sneak by' while their opponents are otherwise occupied. I've said elsewhere that a plane with the F-35's capabilities (systems, range, stealth) won't be 'fought' like fighters of the past. Think of F-35s being fought as a pack of "wolves" or "velociraptors": the opponents will see what the F-35 drivers want them to see... and get shot down by the F-35 they don't see.

I 'do' game theory.

One of the most important facets of any game is 'who gets the last move?' Low observability, while employing techniques and hardware that enable you to keep situational awareness at all times, virtually assures you get the 'last move', and outside of bad luck or negligence you should get the first move as well.

Bonus! Know Your Reformer Sidebar:

James Fallows: Just another Liberal, Know-Nothing, Blowhard.

If you had to pick one person to blame for the lingering after effects of the so-called Military reform Movement, you might have to pick James Fallows, I am in agreement with these parts (and most of the rest) of Marshall L. Michel III's Doctoral Thesis as it frames James Fallows' role in bringing the Reformer Pox into the public domain and upon us (emphasis mine):

The problems with the F-15 led to heavier and heavier criticism from a small but vocal group of defense Critics who maintained America needed larger numbers of less costly systems, but their calls generally went unheeded until the liberal journalist and neoliberal James Fallows joined the Critics ranks in 1979. Fallows was anti-military and a perfect example of Samuel Huntington's thesis of significant tension between American liberal beliefs and the naturally conservative military establishment. At the time, Fallows was researching an article for The Atlantic Monthly considering new ideas about how to cut the military budget, and to find those who agreed with this view he went out on the fringes of the defense establishment.He became interested in the Critics, whom he found kookie but convincing. In the resulting October 1979 article, Muscle Bound Superpower, and later works Fallows decreed the Critics were military combat experts and unquestioningly took up their basic arguments: the American national defense strategy was flawed because the military leadership was incompetent, the weapons acquisition process corrupt, and high defense budgets were linked to high inflation; what America needed was a new strategy that embraced a much greater number of simple, reliable, and less expensive systems. Unspoken was the idea that the money saved would go into social programs. (Pgs 8-9)

and...

Because Fallows believed that the large defense budgets were caused by experts, he eschewed anyone who was seriously associated with the defense establishment because they would understand, if not agree with, the philosophy behind the weapons the military was procuring. He also knew -- or sensed as a reporter that as Samuel Huntington noted, Americans love defense iconoclasts and military mavericks. To find them, Fallows later said he deliberately left the mainstream of defense analysis and moved towards the fringe.(Pgs 295-296)

What a schmuck.

↧

And Now For Something Completely Different Part 1

September 5, 2013, 8:31 pm

≫ Next: Elitists Lament: Their Kind Do Not Serve (Awwwww)

≪ Previous: F-35 Critics: Same Sh*t, Different Century

As a change of pace, and to allow me time to do some research on a major project I have going right now, I thought we'd get away from the daily grind of smacking down "F-35 Hater" stories and post a series of travel pics from some various museums I've visited in the last year. I went to the Kimbell last weekend to see the Wari exhibit, but I don't think the regulars here will be that interested in Pre-Incan art so I'll be sticking to just the aerospace museums in this series. Some/most of these should stretch under the sidebar so click on those pics to see unobstructed views,

Here's a few pics, including panoramas I constructed out of multiple photo shots of the Robins AFB Museum in Georgia. These displays are all restored by, and the museum staffed by volunteers.

Enjoy!

The F-15 is Featured in the Main Museum Building Hall.

As you can see from the tables, the Museum hosts outside functions

SA-2 Missile. Very Big. Flies Very High and Very Fast

Thank goodness they are largely immobile targets, otherwise we'd probably have to deal with later versions evolved from this type.

Tacit Rainbow. The text below the missile is a politically-correct (i.e. LIE) version of why it was cancelled

A man never forgets his first REALLY classified program.

The Remaining Specially-Modified C-130 Modified for a Never Attempted Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission (Corrosion Abounds)

This C-130 is still doing better than the one tragically lost in Flight Test (Takes you to YouTube video of the accident).

Neither C-130 nor Placard are Not Faring Well in the Georgia Heat and Humidity

↧

Elitists Lament: Their Kind Do Not Serve (Awwwww)

September 9, 2013, 7:50 pm

≫ Next: And Now For Something Completely Different Part 2

≪ Previous: And Now For Something Completely Different Part 1

Andrew Bacevich and Maj. Gen. Anthony Cucolo Call for Compulsory Service

That means 'The Draft' boyo's

Hat tip Instapundit(where I pretty much left this post as comment, plus of minus)

Cripes. Not this again...

Some reporter is buying into and spreading Andrew Bacevich's call for the return of the draft/universal service.

      It has been my experience that when this unhinged call for the return of the draft and 'universal' service comes from a Veteran, it invariably comes from draft-era Veterans, almost certainly Army, and usually sporting an advanced liberal-arts degree: all pinin' for those egalitarian days of yore... that never were.
      I enlisted in 1972 at 18, when they were only drafting 19 year olds and up. I entered into an Air Force full of people who didn't want to be there but they were there because they REALLY didn't want to be in the Army. I can't describe how much better it was being in the Air Force after all the draftees who didn't want to be there left. good unit cohesion, high esprit de corps, and generally all around good times, with a miniscule fraction of the number of problem-children, for 20 years --right on through Desert Storm and early Somalia when I retired. NOBODY who ever served in both a draft-era and post-draft era military misses the former. Cucolo wasn't there - he hasn't a clue.

800 Pound Gorilla...
     Which brings us to the 800-pound Gorilla in the room that is REALLY bothering guys like Bacevich: What they really lament deep down in their gut is that those from their neck of the political woods, all the so-called 'elites' (actually self-proclaimed 'exclusives' IMHO) DON'T feel the call to service themselves. So instead of promoting the "everybody in the pool" mentality that will make everyone unhappy, he needs to start finding a fix to the 'wrong' of a political class that by and large does not feel a 'call' to duty of any kind.

'Dorky Pants' Thinking...
     If there is a gulf between the military and community where you live, chances are you are in a
Blue State or a nice big Blue City. Given that most of the military come from the 'Red' states (and Southern ones at that), the problem isn't about the communities where most of the military come from, it's about those who don't join, where they live and WHY they don't. Bacevich's call for universal service falls under what I like to refer to as the Dogbert School of Thought, AKA the 'Dorky Pants Solution'.

Gee Andrew....EVERY "American"?
     Oh yeah! He 'coincidentally' has a new book out: “Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country.”

     Bacevich calls himself a Conservative, because y' know, nothing screams 'Conservative' like COMPULSORY SERVICE.(/sarc).

     That boy's got a Fascist streak eating away at him that I can't abide.

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And Now For Something Completely Different Part 2

September 19, 2013, 8:28 pm

≫ Next: South Korea Passes on Dead Parrot

≪ Previous: Elitists Lament: Their Kind Do Not Serve (Awwwww)

Today's Stop: National Museum of Naval Aviation
As a change of pace, and to allow me time to do some research on a major project I have going right now, I thought we'd get away from the daily grind of smacking down "F-35 Hater" stories and post a series of travel pics from some various museums I've visited in the last year.

These were taken in the middle of last month. I really like the NMNA, it is one of the few around that have sufficient light for most picture taking. This was the first time in 20 years or so that I've been back. The last time, the main building was finished but there were rare treasures sitting in the uncut grass outside. The Chief and I spent 5 hours there this time and we could have spent even more time. We will be back

P.S. If you see 'ghosts' it is because I'm using Photoshop to merge photos into collages and panoramas.

USMC S4C Scout on Floats

NC-4 Seaplane. 6 Engines: 3 Pushin', 3 Pullin'

Underneath the seaplane wing we find a Boeing F-4B

Sopwith Camel

The Navy obtained six Camels after WWI for experiments performed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, operating planes aboard ship using wooden platforms built over the forward turret guns of battleships. this plane has markings replicating those of a Camel operating off the Battleship TEXAS. Normally, launched aircraft were flown ashore, but were also equipped with inflatable air bags underneath the wings to keep the aircraft afloat in the event of a water landing.

"Pacific Maintenance", FM-2 Wildcat

I really enjoy dioramas like this one.

PBY Catalina

The museum has a great full-size 'cutaway' display of a PBY. Can you imagine loooong patrols with the engines (hopefully) droning? I never knew about the 'penthouse' station at the wing attachment point.

A-1 Skyraider

They had a few different versions of the 'SPAD' on display. Note here and elsewhere the tail-hooks of planes past used for sign stanchions. This highlights another great thing about this museum: the ability to get close to the exhibits and REALLY see them.

Lockheed TV-2 : Two Seat, Carrier Operable, version of the Air Force P-80

In reality, this is an Air Force T-33 modified to replicate a TV-2. The Navy acquired quite a few of the TV-2s as their first jet trainer, so it is kind of surprising they didn't have a real one available to display. How'd you like to have to polish it while asea?

Upper Deck Panorama: Lockheed L-10 Electra Center, JRC-1 Left

The JRC-1 was the Navy's version of the Cessna T-50, the Army Air Force's AT-17

Lunch at the 'Cubi Bar Café'

When the Navy shut down operations at Subic Bay, the museum requested some mementos for posterity. What they got was the whole bar, now the museum's restaurant. Food was good, reasonably priced and the atmosphere priceless.

Check out the National Museum of Naval Aviation virtual tour here.

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South Korea Passes on Dead Parrot

September 24, 2013, 7:51 pm

≫ Next: Debunking Close Air Support Myths, 2nd Edition: Part 7

≪ Previous: And Now For Something Completely Different Part 2

Decides Not to Buy F-15 'Silent Eagle'

H/T F-16.net
In the competition to procure a new South Korean fighter to replace their rapidly obsolescing F-4s and F-5s, push came to shove, and military requirements trumped costs.

It is a "No Decision"

South Korea did the only thing they could do under their acquisition laws when the only competitor to make the price point didn't make the performance cutoff: they went back to the drawing board:

South Korea decided not to select Boeing's F-15SE as the country's next fighter jet Tuesday amid concern the sole-remaining candidate for the 8.3 trillion won (US$7.2 billion) project is not suitable as it lacks stealth features....

...Locked in competition with Lockheed Martin's F-35 and EADS' Eurofighter, Boeing was close to winning the deal with a cheaper offer than its rivals. But its fourth-generation aircraft finished in second place behind the F-35 stealth jet in comprehensive assessments, leaving questions over its combat capabilities...

... "A majority of the committee members agreed to reject (F-15 SE) and restart the project, taking into consideration the recent security situation including North Korea's third nuclear test and latest aerospace technology development,"...

... "They agreed that South Korean Air Force needs fifth-generation combat jets to keep pace with the latest trend and to deter provocations by North Korea." ...

...Their rejection on the verge of the final selection illustrates pressure felt by the military and the government to buy 60 jets from the F-15 family with improved features as experts and former Air Force chiefs have expressed concern over the jet's stealth capabilities. As the F-15 SE failed to get approval at the last minute, the DAPA will restart the procurement program, which is expected to further delay the replacement of South Korean Air Force's aging fleet of F-4s and F-5s. ...

... Boeing tried to highlight its conformal weapons bay as one of the key radar-evading features, but it failed to quell questions over its capability against F-35, which is originally designed as a stealth jet.

The Borg Never Quit

With Boeing, the 'Parrot' is never REALLY dead, "it's just pining for the fjords". Boeing's big problem with the Silent Eagle now is other possible shoppers will be asking themselves :What does South Korea know about the F-35 and F-15SE that we don't?

Admin Note: To cut down on possible flaming by 'F-15 Fanboys' and 'F-35 Haters', if you want to assert the F-15 deal was scuttled for reasons other than those the South Koreans have stated in the comments, fine --bring evidence to back it up at the same time.
If not...'Snip'. (you can go libel people someplace else).

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